United Nations S/2014/223

Security Council

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28 March 2014
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 26 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the following information:

Throughout the three years of the Syrian crisis, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has drawn the attention of the Secretary-General and successive Presidents of the Security Council to documented information regarding the actions of and the violations committed by the Turkish Government. Those actions and violations have threatened the security, safety and stability of the Syrian Arab Republic. Turkey has been coordinating, receiving, funding and hosting tens of thousands of terrorists who belong to a variety of takfirist movements. It has also facilitated their entry into Syrian territory and provided them with rear bases in its own territory. When the Turkish regime's efforts to undermine Syria failed, the Turkish Army, acting on instructions from the Head of the Turkish Government, embarked on a blatant campaign of aggression against Syria. Turkish Army tanks and artillery participated directly in an attack against Kassab, which is located in northern Syria, and the surrounding area. Aware of the threat that this action presented to regional security, Syria immediately drew the attention of the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council to the matter in identical letters dated 21 March 2014. In order that you might have a solid and credible picture of Turkey's aggression against Syria and its support for terrorist groups, we should like to convey to the Secretary-General and the President and members of the Security Council the following documented information:

- At 0200 hours on Friday, 21 March 2014, Turkish military forces that were positioned near Kassab, Ladhiqiyah governorate, opened fire on Syrian Arab forces in Kassab and the surrounding area using tanks, artillery and heavy machine guns. Following this barrage, armed terrorist gangs that were positioned in Iskenderun province attacked Syrian military positions in Kassab. This attack was facilitated and supported by the Turkish Army. To date, the armed terrorist groups that entered into certain parts of that area continue to receive artillery support and combat supplies from the Turkish side.

- At 1315 hours on 23 March 2014, a MiG-23 aircraft belonging to the Syrian armed forces that had been carrying out a mission in the Kassab area was shot down by a Turkish warplane using a guided missile. The Syrian aircraft was attacked as it reached its target, which was some 4 kilometres from the border between Iskenderun province and Ladhiqiyah governorate. It fell in the

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Ladhiqiyah countryside, some 7 kilometres from the border. The Syrian Mission in New York will provide you with relevant data from the radars that monitor the skies in that area that will confirm the information above.

- At 1850 hours on 23 March 2014, two Turkish ships positioned some 2 kilometres north-west of the Samra post, which lies next to Iskenderun province, fired on the Syrian post at Samra, causing several deaths and injuries and substantial material damage to the building. This attack was carried out to provide cover for a ground assault by Nusrah Front terrorists against the above-mentioned post. The terrorists launched their attack from inside Iskenderun province at the same time as the Turkish barrage of the post began. As of the morning of 26 March 2014, the Turkish Army continues to facilitate the entry of armed individuals heading towards Kassab and Samra, and to remove those who were killed or wounded from the area using Turkish medical vehicles.

In addition to being a military aggression against a founding Member State of the United Nations, Turkey's direct involvement, which continues to the date of the present letter, is yet another manifestation of the Turkish policy of supporting terrorism in Syria that has been in place since the outset of the crisis, including the blatant support that Turkey has provided to the Nusrah Front, a group that is included in the list of terrorist entities maintained by the Security Council.

All international instruments concerning counter-terrorism and the elimination of Al-Qaida, the most significant of which are Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), prohibit States from cooperating with terrorist organizations associated with Al-Qaida and call on them to refrain from providing such organizations with any assistance for their activities. Those instruments also require States to take a series of measures, including those set out in resolution 1989 (2011), paragraphs 1 (b) and (c), calling on States to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of these individuals.

It has been conclusively proven that the vast majority of the armed terrorists who attacked Kassab are members of the Nusrah Front, which is affiliated with Al-Qaida, and that the Turkish Army provided this group with direct logistical and military support. At its meeting of 30 May 2013, the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) decided to include the Nursah Front for the People of the Levant in the Al-Qaida Sanctions List. Accordingly, that group is subject to the sanctions imposed by the United Nations on Al-Qaida. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic therefore calls on the Security Council and its Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) to condemn without delay this grave development and compel the Turkish Government to halt is aggression. We also call on the Council to hold the Turkish Government accountable for its actions and its systematic support of terrorism in Syria. Unless those States that support terrorism in Syria renounce their policies, the effects of terrorism will not be confined to Syria, but rather will extend to the region and beyond and undermine international counter-terrorism efforts.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2014/224

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 March 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 26 March 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter from the special representative of the Syrian Coalition dated 26 March 2014 in advance of the briefing of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator to the Security Council to be held on 28 March 2014 (see annex).

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdulmohsen **Alyas**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

14-28051 (E) 030414

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Annex to the letter dated 26 March 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, I have the honour to share with you today information on the measures taken by the Syrian Coalition and its partners to improve humanitarian access in the liberated parts of Syria, in anticipation of the briefing of the Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator to the Security Council on 28 March 2014.

The unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014) on 22 February 2014 suggested that the Syrian regime would finally be compelled to meet its obligations under international humanitarian law. We welcomed the efforts of the United Nations, its agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to bring relief to the Syrian people. However, for the past 30 days we have seen the Assad regime continue to obstruct humanitarian access and intensify its indiscriminate and excessive attacks against the Syrian people.

The Syrian Coalition's commitment to Security Council resolution 2139 (2014) and international humanitarian law

The Syrian Coalition is fully committed to international law. Our struggle will establish a Syria that respects the rights of its people and meets its international law and domestic obligations. That is why we have adopted the declaration of Commitment on Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and the Facilitation of Humanitarian Assistance (see enclosure 2). It clearly sets out our commitment to respect international humanitarian law. Our Supreme Military Council's Proclamation of Principles is further evidence of our respect for international law (see enclosure 3).

In addition to reaffirming our commitments in principle, the Syrian Coalition has also worked to uphold our respect for international law in practice. This was ongoing before the adoption of resolution 2139 (2014) and will continue in the coming months. Both the Syrian Coalition and the Free Syrian Army respect both the letter and spirit of resolution 2139 (2014). To demonstrate our commitment, and despite the regime's perpetual use of violence, the Free Syrian Army has, among other things:

- Protected NGOs and facilitated their work in liberated areas
- Established relief offices to deliver supplies to civilians
- Provided protection to minority communities during the regime siege of Homs.

Enclosure 1 provides a more detailed overview of the Coalition's compliance with resolution 2139 (2014).

The regime's non-compliance with resolution 2139 (2014) and international humanitarian law

The Syrian Coalition and Free Syrian Army are making every effort to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law, including compliance with resolution 2139 (2014). As we have previously communicated to the Council, the

regime is responsible for creating and sustaining the humanitarian catastrophe that our people have been subjected to for the past three years. It is the Syrian regime's responsibility to fulfil its obligations under international law. However, instead of fulfilling its legal responsibilities, we have seen the Syrian regime:

- Escalate its attacks against civilian populated areas, including through the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of barrel bombs and heavy weaponry
- Fail to achieve real progress in implementation of the Security Council Presidential Statement of 2 October 2013 (S/PRST/2013/15)
- Besiege civilian populations as part of its "submission through starvation" policy
- Detain men evacuated from Homs
- Remove medical supplies from humanitarian convoys
- On multiple occasions, deny authorization for United Nations convoys to deliver humanitarian aid to opposition-held areas.

To illustrate the regime's continued obstruction of humanitarian relief, three specific examples include:

- 24 February: a World Health Organization shipment of medicine was stopped at a regime checkpoint until it was released on 5 March (arriving in Al Raqqa on 8 March)
- 7 March: a range of medical items, including antibiotics and anti-bacterial medicines, were removed from an aid convoy to Al Houla by regime security authorities
- 12 March: medicines and medical supplies were removed by regime authorities from a convoy destined for Adraa al-Umallyeh and Adraa Albalad
- 8 February 2014: during the evacuation of a handful of civilians from the Old City of Homs, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that 125,000 citizens of Aleppo had been displaced in one weekend as a result of the intensification of the bombing of the city. The United Nations request for an urgent inter-agency convoy to provide assistance to the displaced was denied.

In addition, as reports by the independent international commission of inquiry (see A/HRC/25/65) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs both demonstrate, the Syrian regime has routinely committed atrocities and abuses at official detention facilities, at checkpoints in besieged areas and in house raids. It has made no effort to distinguish between civilians and combatants and has instead deployed artillery shelling and air strikes, including barrel bombs, in heavily populated civilian areas. These atrocities constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes and have not diminished since the adoption of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014).

Next steps

The Assad regime does not intend to meet its obligations under international law. It has consistently demonstrated this since the start of its brutal oppression of

the Syrian revolution three years ago. Security Council resolution 2139 (2014) has, unfortunately, failed to change the regime's behaviour.

In its resolution 2139 (2014), the Security Council unanimously pledged to "take further steps in the case of non-compliance with this resolution". One month after the adoption of the resolution, the Syrian regime has refused to comply with the will of the Council. And it has given no indication that it intends to do so. In the light of the Syrian regime's continued violations of resolution 2139 (2014), we call on the members of the Security Council to take all necessary measures to uphold international law and ensure the Syrian regime's full and immediate compliance with resolution 2139 (2014).

It is critical now, as it has been for the past three years, that the Security Council apply increased pressure on the regime to ensure that it complies with the will of the Council and its international obligations. Only significant action that will compel the regime to change its behaviour will ensure that there is a chance to relieve the appalling humanitarian situation in Syria.

With or without further Security Council action, the Syrian regime is bound by customary international law, as reflected in article 70 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. The 3.5 million people in hard-to-reach areas must be able to access humanitarian aid through the most direct routes, including across borders. Any obstruction or arbitrary denial of access by the regime must be treated by the Security Council as a grave violation of international law.

(*Signed*) Najib **Ghadbian**
Special Representative of the Syrian Coalition
to the United Nations

Enclosure 1

Syrian Coalition and Free Syrian Army compliance with Security Council resolution 2139 (2014)

(i) Operative paragraph 3: All parties must cease attacks against civilians

- The Free Syrian Army (Free Syrian Army) was formed in 2011 to protect civilians from regime brutality. It disavows all attacks on civilians, and condemns the use of aerial bombardments and ground-to-ground rockets. The Free Syrian Army also condemns all attacks against civilian neighbourhoods, schools, apartment buildings, bakeries or hospitals, irrespective of their perpetrators.
- In 2013, the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army issued its proclamation on the protection of civilians and commitment to human rights (annex III). To ensure that the proclamation is properly understood and applied, Free Syrian Army legal scholars give seminars on international humanitarian law to units and make regular visits to Free Syrian Army-held territories.
- No civilians may be targeted by Free Syrian Army forces. To ensure that this principle is upheld, all Free Syrian Army targets must be approved by the command structure. Anyone found to act in contravention of this principle will be held accountable as demanded by international law.
- To ensure that all civilian lives are spared and medical care reaches those in need, the Free Syrian Army carries out search and rescue operations following regime attacks.

(ii) Operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7: All parties must allow the delivery of humanitarian assistance, grant humanitarian access, including across borders and across lines, and facilitate the efforts of the United Nations

- Free Syrian Army brigades respect, protect and facilitate the work of NGOs in liberated areas. The Free Syrian Army facilitates NGOs' entry into northern Syria, including the Maram Foundation and Karam Foundation, which provide humanitarian relief to Syrian children and operate schools and women's centres in Idlib and Aleppo provinces. International NGOs have likewise worked closely with Free Syrian Army units across northern Syria to obtain safe access to Syrians in need.
- Free Syrian Army groups such as the Syrian Revolutionaries Front have established relief offices that deliver supplies to communities in the liberated territories.
- The relief office of the Free Syrian Army has delivered goods to Syrian children in Idlib and Hama provinces. This distribution is accomplished by facilitating the movement of NGO humanitarian goods into areas under attack by the Assad regime in northern Syria.
- The Syrian Revolutionaries Front has also distributed relief aid to the minority Druze population.
- The Revolutionary Council in Deir ez-Zor also maintains a relief office that distributes aid throughout the province.

- The relief provided by the Free Syrian Army stands in stark contrast to the Syrian regime. In Al Wa'er, for example, the Syrian regime is denying humanitarian access and implementing a policy of starvation into submission. While the villages Ghasbeih and Haswiya are under the control of the Free Syrian Army, the village of Dwair itself is under the control of the regime, from which the Syrian regime is firing into the neighbouring areas and targeting civilians.

(iii) Operative paragraph 5: All parties must lift the sieges of populated areas

- There is an accusation that "the opposition" is besieging the Aleppo towns of Nubl and Zahra.
- Distinction should be made between different types of armed groups, as the independent international commission of inquiry did in its report. We condemn any besiegement of civilians.
- The regime has turned Nubl and Zahra into military strongholds, with many heavy weapons in use there, and is using the towns as bases from which to bomb and attack neighbouring villages.
- The Free Syrian Army is not besieging the towns. The brigades active in that area are extremist brigades.
- We recommend that the United Nations try to verify the facts on the ground, including whether regime forces control at least one access route into the area (Afrin Road), and whether or to what extent there are shortages in humanitarian supplies in the referenced areas. The Free Syrian Army will make every effort to try to facilitate humanitarian access to these areas.

(iv) Operative paragraph 5: All parties agree to humanitarian pauses, local ceasefires and truces

- There have been local humanitarian pauses. Where they have failed, it has been because of the regime. This includes in Homs, where the regime fired on an aid convoy on 8 February 2014.
- When Aleppo was out of drinking water, a ceasefire was agreed to let fuel and sanitizers pass through for pumping stations. That worked, and drinking water came back online. However, the regime broke the ceasefire in September 2012, killing two Free Syrian Army fighters. Nevertheless, the Free Syrian Army maintained its ceasefire.
- Local ceasefires were also broken by the regime in Mouaddamiah and Barza.

(v) Operative paragraph 8: Medical neutrality

- The Free Syrian Army has issued strict instructions to ensure the work of medical missions and the non-use and non-acquisition of materials belonging to civilians.
- In February 2014, the Free Syrian Army allowed passage of the Red Crescent to the central prison in Aleppo, so that it could bring food and medicine to prisoners and regime forces.

(vi) **Operative paragraph 9: All parties shall protect civilians, including ethnic minorities**

- The Free Syrian Army does not target any person for ethnic, religious, or confessional reasons.
- For example, there are many Kurdish villages under the control of the Free Syrian Army in the north of Aleppo (those that are not are controlled by the Democratic Union Party (PYD)). The only threat to these villages comes from regime bombing.
- In old Homs, some Christian communities remained under the protection of the Free Syrian Army during the long siege by the regime.
- In Kadin on the Syrian coast, the Murshidi community lived under the auspices of the Free Syrian Army for almost a year. In August 2013, the regime bombed and threatened the Murshidi, as a result of which they were forcibly displaced.

(vii) **Operative paragraph 10: All parties must demilitarize hospitals, schools, etc.**

- The Free Syrian Army evacuated schools in Manbaj. Unfortunately, the city was subsequently controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS).
- The Tawheed Brigade has evacuated the buildings of Aleppo hospital in the Hanano area.
- Hospitals and schools have been the targets of regime aerial bombing. For example, 10 students died in Masaken Hanano in Aleppo as a result of barrel bombing on 22 December 2013; 11 people died on 11 September 2013 when a makeshift hospital in Bab city, Aleppo, was bombed from the air.

(viii) **Operative paragraph 11: All parties must end practices of detention and torture**

- Free Syrian Army groups have established police forces to protect citizens from kidnapping. For example, Free Syrian Army police forces have been established in the western suburbs of Aleppo.

(ix) **Operative paragraph 12: All parties must ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel**

- The Free Syrian Army does not target United Nations personnel, and will make arrangements for their protection whenever requested to do so, provided they are given information on areas and routes on which protection is required.
- This is equally true for the international NGOs with whom Free Syrian Army units have been working over the past year. Relations between international NGOs and Free Syrian Army units are well established and working smoothly.

(x) **Operative paragraph 14: All parties must reject terrorism and terrorist organizations**

- The Free Syrian Army has been fighting the extremists of al-Qaeda-linked ISIS for the past four months.

- For example, in Al Raqqa, a governorate that is under the control of ISIS, the Free Syrian Army is urgently trying to liberate it and has repeatedly condemned ISIS presence there.
- ISIS was defeated and pushed out of Idlib, Hama suburbs, Deir ez-Zor, Aleppo city, and north of Aleppo.
- The Free Syrian Army has suffered significant casualties from its engagement on two fronts, with the regime and with ISIS, to pursue the democratic objectives of the uprising. Neither foe has acted accordingly, opting to fight the Free Syrian Army only. The regime is as a result de facto colluding with the terrorist organization ISIS.

(xi) Operative paragraph 15: All parties must work towards the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué

- The goal of the Geneva Conference is the full implementation of the Geneva Communiqué, beginning with the establishment of a transitional governing body exercising full executive powers, which could include members of the present Government and the opposition and other groups, and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent.
- The Syrian Coalition came to Geneva in January and February 2014 prepared to engage proactively and constructively to reach a political solution to the Syrian conflict.
- At every session, the Syrian Coalition put forward positive and implementable positions. The Assad regime came prepared only to obfuscate and delay. Repeatedly, the regime's delegation showed itself unwilling to address the core issues raised in the Geneva Communiqué.
- During the Geneva negotiations, the Syrian Coalition introduced a Statement of Basic Principles, which proposed a framework for transition. However, the Syrian regime refused even to discuss it.
- The Syrian Coalition broadened its representation during the Geneva process, including by bringing representatives from armed groups during the second round of negotiations.
- The Syrian Coalition adopted the Declaration of Commitment on Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and the Facilitation of Humanitarian Assistance and sent a letter on 19 March 2014 to Under-Secretary-General Amos confirming this (see enclosure 2).

Enclosure 2

National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces

Office of the President

Declaration of Commitment on Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and the Facilitation of Humanitarian Assistance

We *agree* that the interests and well-being of the Syrian people are our top priority, and affirm our commitment to protect and respect civilians and ensure that they are assisted henceforth and at all times;

We *affirm* our responsibility to respect international humanitarian law at all times including, without prejudice to the ongoing application of the rules not enumerated here, the responsibilities to:

- Distinguish at all time between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives, and direct attacks solely against military objectives
- Respect and protect schools and hospitals, and refrain from using them in support of the military effort, including by locating military objectives within or near them
- Refrain from the recruitment of children and the use of children in hostilities
- Refrain from any form of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, including sexual violence of all kinds
- Respect the wounded and sick, including combatants, and allow them to receive, to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, the medical care required by their condition, without discrimination
- Respect and protect relief workers, allow and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of relief, including medical and surgical equipment, and grant authorized relief personnel freedom of movement to reach people in need on the basis of need alone, unless imperative military necessity requires their movements to be temporarily restricted
- Allow all civilians safe evacuation from, and allow the rapid and unimpeded passage of relief consignments into, all besieged areas
- Treat all persons deprived of their liberty humanely and provide an impartial, neutral and independent organization with regular access to persons in detention.

In addition to these responsibilities, we agree to:

- Refrain from the use of heavy weapons in population centres
- Respect and uphold the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence
- Immediately agree upon and facilitate arrangements to undertake essential immunization campaigns in the entirety of the Syrian territory

- Adopt simple and expedited procedures for all logistical and administrative arrangements necessary for humanitarian relief operations
- Work immediately and in good faith with representatives of humanitarian agencies to agree on practical arrangements for the provision of assistance to meet the needs of all civilians, including through the rapid authorization of humanitarian convoys, and the implementation of regular humanitarian pauses, local deconfliction arrangements and days of tranquillity
- Take all necessary measures to ensure that all elements acting on our instructions or under our direction or control abide by the commitments of international humanitarian law and of this Declaration, and investigate all allegations of violations and hold accountable those responsible.

Enclosure 3

[Original: English and Arabic]

Supreme Military Council

Proclamation of Principles

The Supreme Military Council hereby proclaims the following principles:

- We believe in a free and democratic Syria where all Syrian citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, creed, religion or class shall enjoy equal rights and live in liberty, justice and peace.
- We believe in a pluralistic, multi-ethnic, multi-religious society that honours and upholds freedom of expression, thought and conscience.
- We believe in the freedom of association and assembly. No Syrian shall be forced into a political association or denied equal participation in political life.
- We believe that the rule of law shall apply equally to all Syrians, shall be honoured by the governing bodies of Syria, and shall reign supreme throughout the nation.
- We believe that the governing bodies and public authorities shall protect all citizens from persecution, fear and cruel or unusual punishment.
- We reject all forms of terrorism and will fight against the scourge of revenge killing in our land.
- We recognized the threat posed by Syria's chemical and biological weapons stockpiles and pledge to safeguard these dangerous materials.
- We welcome peace and security in our region, the wider Middle East and beyond.
- The Free Syrian Army is a military structure responsible to all Syrian citizens and will submit to the authority of a democratically elected civilian government.
- We seek a peaceful end to Syria's crisis, but will fight if necessary to end the dictatorship of the Assad. Our aim is to protect Syria's civilians and to guarantee a brighter future.
- We will uphold international humanitarian laws, including treating prisoners humanely, even as the Assad regime engages in crimes against humanity and ignores international obligations. Additionally, we will not tolerate the killing or maiming of civilians, the recruitment or use of children by armed groups, attacks on schools or hospitals, kidnapping or abduction, denial of humanitarian access, or sexual violence.
- We welcome our international allies and partners to assist us in this revolution for freedom and dignity.

United Nations S/2014/225

Security Council

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Letter dated 26 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In my country's capacity as Chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, I have the honour to forward herewith the final communiqué adopted at the summit meeting held in Luanda on 25 March 2014, with the request that it be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ismael A. Gaspar **Martins**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-27962 (E) 310314

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Annex to the letter dated 26 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and French]

Mini-summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region held in Luanda on 25 March 2014

Final communiqué

At the initiative of His Excellency José Eduardo dos Santos, President of the Republic of Angola and Chairman of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, gathered in summit session in Luanda on 25 March 2014 the Heads of State and Government of the Conference Committee of the Great Lakes Region, namely His Excellency José Eduardo dos Santos, President of the Republic of Angola, His Excellency Joseph Kabila, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, His Excellency Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda, His Excellency Yoweri Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda, His Excellency Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of the Republic of the Congo, and His Excellency Jacob Zuma, President of the Republic of South Africa as a special guest.

The Heads of State and Government reviewed the ways to speed up the materialization of the deliberations from the last summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, held in Luanda on 15 January 2014.

The Heads of State and Government took note of detailed information from His Excellency Joseph Kabila on the situation in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and on the efforts that this Government is undertaking aimed at concluding the process of demobilization and reintegration into society of the former M23 fighters, and recalled the need to mobilize financial resources to this effect.

Furthermore, he informed the meeting of the results of the activities carried out by FARDC to neutralize ADF and continue with the pacification and stabilization of the region.

The mini-summit took note of the report of the meeting of Chiefs of Staff held in Luanda on 24 and 25 March 2014, and endorsed the following recommendations:

1. Adopt a common approach for fighting against negative forces while taking into account that their activities are highly fuelled through illicit trade of natural resources. Such an approach could include but not be limited to blacklisting of companies or individuals trading with these forces. Political and economic sanctions should be taken against all negative forces.

2. Strengthen regional and international cooperation in identification and neutralization of leaders of all negative forces still active in the region.

3. Consider the quick repatriation, in collaboration with the United Nations, of the ex-M23 elements from Uganda and Rwanda which constitute a burden for the two countries.

4. Commend the promulgation of the amnesty law by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and call for speeding up the implementation of

the Nairobi Declaration in order to facilitate the resolution of the issue of ex-M23 elements.

The mini-summit commended the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the results and encouraged it to undertake and pursue similar actions against FDLR.

As regards FDLR, the Heads of State followed the explanation by His Excellency Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda, and by His Excellency Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of the Republic of the Congo, and recommended coordinated efforts aimed at:

(a) Continued repatriation of those willing to disarm and return voluntarily;

(b) Engaging urgently military actions against those unwilling to disarm, in line with the recommendations of the Chiefs of Defence Staff.

The Heads of State and Government also reviewed in detail the overall security situation prevailing in the Great Lakes region and in southern Africa and have recommended relevant measures.

The Heads of State commended His Excellency President José Eduardo dos Santos for his efforts to find peaceful solutions to the conflicts in the Great Lakes region and expressed their gratitude for the warm welcome and hospitality which contributed to achieving a successful outcome of the mini-summit.

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Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 110
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 26 March 2014 from the Chargé d' affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit the letter of Mr. M. Javad Zarif, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on the shocking news about the possible murder of one of the five Iranian border guards abducted on 7 February 2014 (see annex).

I would highly appreciate if you could have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 110, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gholamhossein **Dehghani**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

14-28104 (E) 020414

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Annex to the letter dated 26 March 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the unpleasant duty to draw your attention to the shocking news about the possible murder of one of the five Iranian border guards abducted on 7 February 2014 by an extremist terrorist group, in the border area between Iran and Pakistan. This is the latest in a series of similar terrorist atrocities against Iranian citizens, including diplomats and other officials and innocent civilians of Iranian and other nationalities, which include:

- Repeated explosions and terrorist attacks on our eastern border in recent months, which have resulted in the murder of at least 12 soldiers.
- Two car-bomb attacks on the Iranian diplomatic and cultural premises in Beirut on 19 November 2013 and 19 February 2014, killing one diplomat and a dozen security guards and many Lebanese civilian bystanders.
- The abduction and murder of Iranian diplomatic personnel in Sana'a, including the kidnapping of an Iranian diplomat, Mr. Nour Ahmad Nikbakht, on 21 July 2013, and the brutal assassination of another, Mr. Abolghassem Assadi, on 18 January 2014.
- A suicide attack on the Iranian Consulate-General in Peshawar, on 25 February 2014, killing two security guards and injuring many innocent Pakistani bystanders.

It is extremely regrettable that all available evidence indicates that these cowardly acts of terror targeting the Islamic Republic of Iran and its citizens have been perpetrated by State-sponsored extremist groups, with similar patterns of funding, coordination, support and direction. The entire international community should be alarmed by the regional and extraregional ramifications of sectarian tension and extremist violence, which are being systematically organized, sponsored and orchestrated in various parts of our region. In fact, learning from recent history, a sober assessment of the medium- and long-term implications of this dangerous trend will show that the very sponsors of such hatred, who for ill-conceived interests have hastily resorted to such short-sighted tactics to remedy their strategic miscalculations and failures, stand to lose the most from the sectarian and extremist violence that they are spreading.

Moreover, there is very little doubt concerning the inherent and reinforcing interrelationship in our region between a perpetual war economy, extremist violence and terrorism on the one side, and drug trafficking and transnational organized crime on the other. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been in the forefront of the global campaign against drug trafficking, with narcotic seizures by Iran amounting to over three quarters of the entire confiscations throughout the world. Being in the first line of defence against this global menace has cost Iran dearly in blood and treasure, without any meaningful international cooperation to share the cost, provide technological assistance, or at least take a resolute stance against those who have exacted a heavy toll on Iran, its innocent civilians and brave soldiers. While our sacrifices help to protect the entire humanity from the scourge of narcotics, the international community is simply not doing enough to help Iran in this never-ending struggle. Mere condemnation of acts of terrorism does not suffice.

In the past few days, all Iranians celebrated Nowruz — recognized by the General Assembly as an international day of peace, neighbourliness and solidarity — sharing the sense of grief and desperate anticipation of the families and loved ones of these national heroes. While we note the efforts of the Governments of Pakistan, Lebanon and Yemen, our hostages remain in captivity and the perpetrators of previous crimes have yet to face justice. The Iranian people have every right to demand more resolute global action, yielding practical results in bringing their hostages back home and in bringing to justice those responsible for the murder of their compatriots. A manifestation of this legitimate demand can be seen in the grass roots one-million signature campaign organized by Iranian youth, from all walks of life, calling upon you and other national and international authorities to take stronger measures to secure the early and safe return of their hostages. Through this letter, I join them in their dignified appeal to the global community.

I will be grateful if you have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

M. Javad **Zarif**
Minister for Foreign Affairs

United Nations A/68/818–S/2014/227

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General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 36
Question of Palestine

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 26 March 2014 from the Permanent Representatives of Indonesia and Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to transmit herewith the joint statement of the second ministerial meeting of the Conference on Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development (see annex), issued on 1 March in Jakarta.

Launched by Japan in February 2013 in Tokyo, the Conference on Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development is a process aimed at mobilizing and sharing East Asian economic development experiences and resources for Palestinian development. Its second ministerial meeting was held on 1 March in Jakarta under the co-chairmanship of Indonesia, Palestine and Japan. Participants reiterated their commitment to support Palestinian development through, among other efforts, capacity-building and reinvigoration of the business environment. They also emphasized that the Conference is a useful forum to promote support for Palestinians.

We would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 36, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Desra **Percaya**
Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Motohide **Yoshikawa**
Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations

14-28267 (E) 040414

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Annex to the letter dated 26 March 2014 from the Permanent Representatives of Indonesia and Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Second Conference on Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development
Jakarta, 1 March 2014

Joint statement

East Asian countries partnership for Palestine

We, the Ministers, and high-ranking officials from countries in East Asia and Palestine, as well as representatives of countries and international organizations involved in the Middle East peace process and Palestinian development, met in Jakarta, on 1 March 2014, to participate in the second Conference on Cooperation among East Asia Countries for Palestinian Development (CEAPAD).

We highlighted the statement of the President of the Republic of Indonesia about continuing Indonesia's support for Palestine's national development, and its struggle to be a sovereign country and a full member of the United Nations. This conference aims to renew continuous commitment to support Palestine so as to ensure that the Palestinians are capable of providing essential services to their people.

We further highlighted the statement of the Prime Minister of Palestine, to reaffirm that CEAPAD epitomizes the very nature of all our aspirations regarding the building of the Palestinian State. The conference should be considered as a journey together that recognizes the importance of Palestinian mobility, supporting the development of our capacity and enhancing our ability to participate within the ever-changing economic global landscape. Through CEAPAD we will continue to build partnerships across economic and political spheres and exchange knowledge. At the end, the Prime Minister expressed his hope that these combined efforts will ensure a better future for the Palestinian people.

At the meeting we:

- Reiterated the commitment of East Asian countries and international organizations to support Palestine and the ongoing Middle East peace process through supporting the development of Palestine, including capacity development and reinvigorating the business environment for the realization of the two-State solution based on the relevant United Nations resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative.
- Emphasize CEAPAD as a forum to exchange experiences, encourage support for Palestinians, including Palestinian refugees, and add value to the already existing initiatives and processes aimed at assisting Palestinian development.
- Recalled the results of the first meeting of CEAPAD in Tokyo on 14 February 2013, at which the participants of the meeting recognized East Asian countries' political and economic standing and potential, and that countries could strengthen their constructive role and consider having regular consultations

among them, including their aid agencies, to mobilize more effective assistance to Palestinians, through:

- Emphasizing the role of the private sector in the Palestinian economic development;
- Encouraging future cooperation through the existing trilateral cooperation to implement further multifaceted capacity development efforts in Palestine;
- Considering some measures that can be carried out, namely, to ensure Palestinian national ownership of all capacity-building programmes undertaken, to identify capacities and experiences that East Asian countries can feasibly offer, to ensure coordination between the Palestine and international actors in assisting Palestinian development, and to ensure sustainability of the impacts of the programmes.

And hereby:

1. Welcome the holding of the aid coordination meeting and the private sector promotion meeting, and recognize the importance of the attached outcome documents (see annex I to the joint statement).
2. Welcome the sharing of knowledge on and experiences in East Asian economic, institutional and social development to help the State-building effort of Palestine in accordance with the national priorities.
3. Wish to respond to other needs of the Palestinians in the areas of, for instance, institution-building, community development and financial support.
4. Welcome the contribution in providing the human resources development programmes in the areas that are relevant to the experiences and capacities of East Asian countries, and in line with the Palestine National Development Plan. The list of human resources development programmes for Palestine with target areas is attached (see annex II).
5. Welcome the pledge of Japan, Indonesia and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) on the programmes for promoting private sectors in Palestine (see annex III), and encourage East Asian countries and international organizations to provide programmes in this regard.
6. Highlight that the amount of the pledges made by participating countries and international organizations to support Palestinian development since the first Conference on Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development has reached $210 million.
7. Appreciate the initiative of Indonesia to start promoting private sector development in Palestine in five sectors: tourism, light manufacturing, agriculture, information and communications technology (ICT), and infrastructure (based on the Palestinian National Development Plan), through holding the Business Forum and Trade Expo on 1 and 2 March 2014, which provided opportunities to the business network making and exchanges of business missions between Palestine and East Asian countries. In this regard, the participants acknowledge the involvement and contribution of Palestine private sectors, East Asian countries and international organizations to the Business Forum and Trade Expo.

8. Appreciate continuous efforts to implement the trilateral cooperation, bearing in mind the priority areas of assistance in support of human resource development for Palestine indicated in annex II, between Japan and Indonesia, Japan and Malaysia and Japan and Singapore. The participants also welcome the new projects in the following trilateral cooperations: (i) Indonesia and Thailand; (ii) Japan and Indonesia; (iii) Japan and Malaysia; and (iv) Japan and Thailand.

9. Welcome IDB, the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development in establishing a mechanism for the CEAPAD capacity-building programmes, in addition to other existing mechanisms.

10. Encourage greater engagement of civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of the East Asian countries, and call for the next host of the third CEAPAD to invite them to a CEAPAD meeting, to share their experience and give contributions to assist Palestine.

11. Hold working-level meetings among interested countries, in particular the future host of the CEAPAD-related meetings, on an ad hoc basis to follow up measures decided upon and items raised in the previous meeting, as well as to prepare for the future CEAPAD meetings.

12. Invite wider partnership with international organizations that are involved in the independency and self-sufficiency of Palestine and the Middle East peace process and to support the cooperation with international initiatives, including small, speedy grass-roots projects targeted at Palestinian communities and the Palestinian Economic Initiative by the Office of the Quartet Representative. In this regard, the participants appreciate the initial commitment of Japan of $20 million for the grass-roots projects.

The participants reaffirm that the CEAPAD meeting will be a forum to discuss, to exchange experiences and to add value to the already existing initiatives and processes that have been undertaken by countries in East Asia in assisting Palestinian development. Moreover, CEAPAD will serve as an effective tool to strengthen development cooperation among East Asian countries to support Palestinians, including Palestinian refugees.

The participants express gratitude to Indonesia for hosting the second CEAPAD.

Annex I

Outcome document in support of human resource development for Palestine

Conference on Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development aid coordination meeting

1. The participants confirmed, against the backdrop of the recent progress in the Middle East peace process, their strong determination to contribute to achieving peace through the realization of the "two-State solution" based on the relevant United Nations resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative in realizing the sustainable economic and social development of Palestine. In this regard, the participants emphasized that the development of the Conference on Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development (CEAPAD) enables its participants to play an even more important role in the development of Palestine.

2. The participants expressed their views that the CEAPAD participants would be able to contribute to supporting the Palestinian State-building efforts by sharing their experiences and lessons of their economic development of the past few decades. In this regard, the CEAPAD participants encourage other countries to participate in CEAPAD and to enhance the effectiveness of their assistance to Palestine.

3. In particular, the participants consider cooperation among East Asian countries as a useful tool to support Palestine in the field of human resource development. The participants expressed their willingness to continue sharing their good practices through aid coordination meetings and programmes aiming at achieving more effective and efficient cooperation among the participants. In addition, the participants highly appreciated the efforts made for the bilateral, trilateral and multilateral cooperation for Palestine by the participants in the past.

4. The participants agreed that the CEAPAD aid coordination meeting could function as a forum/platform to coordinate assistance among the participants in human resource development for Palestine through matching Palestine's needs for assistance with the potential resources of the CEAPAD participants. The aid coordination meeting also facilitates participants to maximize the synergistic effects of their assistance and to avoid the duplication of projects among participants.

5. The participants welcomed the initiative by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to develop the CEAPAD coordination mechanism in support of technical cooperation for capacity development in Palestine, in collaboration with the Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development and the participants.

6. The participants welcomed Palestine's presentation of the list of priorities in human resource development assistance to the meeting. In response, the CEAPAD participants, taking into consideration the strength and comparative advantage of each participant's assistance towards Palestine, expressed their commitment to make the utmost efforts to develop assistance projects in accordance with Palestine's priorities, including the support to Palestinian refugees identified in cooperation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

7. The participants agreed to make an utmost effort to set a target number of capacity development activities in support of human resource development in Palestine. The target number set by the participants will be submitted to the second meeting of CEAPAD in 2014 in Indonesia.

8. The participants expressed the importance of holding regular CEAPAD aid coordination meetings to facilitate new assistance to Palestine and to review the progress of each participant's assistance under the framework of CEAPAD.

9. This forum adds value to, and honours, the existing mechanisms that are currently in place between Palestine and the participants.

As at 29 November 2013

Outcome document in support of human resource development for Palestine

Indicated priority areas of assistance

Sector	*Country*
Water	Japan, Indonesia
Tourism and antiquities	Japan, Thailand
Agriculture	Japan, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia
Local governance	Japan, Republic of Korea
Economic (including small and medium-sized enterprises)	Japan, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia
Vocational training	Thailand
Finance	Japan, Malaysia
Education	Singapore
Information and Communications Technology	Indonesia, Republic of Korea

Note: Other sectors will be added as the countries express their possibility of extending assistance.

- The individual sectors in the table above are open to the CEAPAD participants. Members can join or leave the groups according to their own assistance policy.
- The coordination in each group will be carried out through a focal point country to be decided in due course.

Outcome documents of the private sector promotion meeting of the Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development

3 December 2013, Tokyo

1. Background

(a) The first meeting of the Conference on the Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development (CEAPAD) was held in Tokyo on 13 and 14 February 2013, in order to share the needs of Palestine, as well as the experience of the Asian economic development, and to mobilize resources of the participating countries.

(b) The political environment has seen some development since the last meeting, such as the resumption of direct negotiations between Israel and Palestine on 29 July 2013. While hope for a final status agreement has increased, a stable fiscal condition, a strong economy, trade access and equitable development are necessary in order to achieve a Palestinian sovereign State. A number of new international initiatives are being discussed, and some new donor efforts have been taking shape, since the resumption of the peace talks.

(c) The CEAPAD private sector promotion meeting was convened against that background on 2 and 3 December 2013 in Tokyo. The purpose of the meeting was to find ways and means to strengthen the Palestinian economy and its private sector, as well as to build and enhance business relations between Palestine and other CEAPAD participants.

(d) Participation of India at this private sector promotion meeting was warmly welcomed by Palestine and other CEAPAD participants, and it is welcome to participate in future CEAPAD meetings.

(e) Representatives from the private sectors also participated in the meeting, and enriched the discussions. Representatives from the Governments of Australia, Norway, the United States of America and the Office of the Quartet Representative also participated as special guests.

2. Business environment in Palestine

(a) The representative of Palestine elaborated on the economic situation in Palestine, highlighting the current severe fiscal crisis, high unemployment ratio and slow growth of gross domestic product. To overcome these difficulties, three strategic economic objectives were explained: (i) diversify the economy; (ii) develop an enabling business and investment environment; and (iii) enable and empower institutions to facilitate economic development and regulate markets.

(b) The representative of Palestine presented the progress that has been made by the Palestinian Government to meet the above-mentioned three objectives.

(c) The representative of Palestine highlighted the restrictions on foreign investments in Palestine, especially in Area C and East Jerusalem, owing to the Israeli occupation. The representative, however, also pointed out the tremendous potential available for economic development and private investments in Palestine if the Israeli restrictions were to be lifted and specific enablers put in place. The

current political environment and resumed peace talks will hopefully pave the way for windows of opportunity in the future.

3. Summary of discussions

(a) The participants underlined the need to support Palestinian State-building efforts, which must be accompanied by a sound fiscal situation, a diversified economy, a trade-competitive private sector and capable human resources.

(b) The participants expressed their intention to help Palestine in the development of its private sector and to promote investment and trade between Palestine and other CEAPAD participants. Stronger business relations between them are beneficial and desirable for both sides.

(c) The participants shared views on the usefulness of engaging in the following measures for the benefit of Palestine:

- To explore the potential for business opportunities, both investment and trade
- To find ways and means to facilitate private sector businesses
- To study possible financial incentives to induce investment
- To help build Palestinian human and institutional capacity for business promotion
- To help expand the Palestinian private sector's international networks and its access to international markets
- To support Palestinian women entrepreneurship

(d) The representative of Palestine pointed out that tourism, agriculture, information and communications technology (ICT), and light manufacturing can be targeted sectors that have high potential for development, at least for the short and mid-term.

(e) The participants expressed their intention to explore potential to cooperate with and/or support relevant ministries, organizations, agencies, institutions and initiatives for this purpose. The Chamber of Commerce, the Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency (PIPA), the Palestinian Industrial Estates and Free Zone Authority (PIEFZA), the Palestinian Trade Center (PALTRADE) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East are among those.

4. Future efforts

The participants confirm that the following are possible actions for strengthening the Palestinian private sector and enhancing economic relations between Asia and Palestine:

(a) Capacity-building

Through capacity-building measures, including training programmes, Asian participants will endeavour to share with Palestine the experiences, lessons and know-how of their economic and fiscal policies for private sector development. In view of the need to advance the CEAPAD agenda, the participants welcome the

proposal of the joint initiative moved by the Palestinian Ministry of Planning, the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) to provide this alliance with a multilateral mechanism to enable the delivery of efficient and effective development assistance to Palestine. The proposed CEAPAD mechanism, in addition to the existing mechanism, is expected to pull together tremendous resources and expertise of the CEAPAD participating country Governments, development institutions, private and civil society entities, and other regional and international partners, and to channel such resources to address priority needs in Palestinian human development.

(b) Enhancing Asia-Palestine economic relations

- The CEAPAD participants will endeavour to organize events for facilitating trade, such as a trade fair, in their own countries.
- The CEAPAD participants intend to hold workshops to explore business opportunities and to find ways and means to facilitate businesses. The Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, the Ministry of National Economy, the Palestinian Monetary Authority, PIPA, and the Palestinian Chamber of Commerce are among the relevant agencies that will be included in such seminars. All efforts to engage the relevant Palestinian agencies will be carried out through the Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development.
- Indonesia informed that the Government of Indonesia will hold a CEAPAD business meeting and Expo on the sidelines of the second CEAPAD meeting in March 2014.
- The Palestinian officials in charge of foreign investment will be dispatched to Asian countries to induce investment from Asia to Palestine with the support from the receiving countries.
- IDB will consider supporting measures to induce investment and marketing activities in Palestine.
- CEAPAD will explore the possibility of launching a mechanism to facilitate investment and transfer of technology from Asia to Palestine.
- The CEAPAD participants will consider cooperation with ongoing initiatives stimulating the Palestinian economy, including the Jericho Agro-Industrial Park, through encouraging trade, investment and assistance.
- The CEAPAD participants will consider possible concrete steps to develop the Palestinian private sector's international networks with East Asian business communities.

(c) Cooperation with the international community

CEAPAD will coordinate with the international community's efforts for Palestinian economic development such as the Palestinian Economic Initiative and High Impact Micro-Infrastructure Initiative.

(d) Follow-up and second CEAPAD ministerial meeting in Indonesia

- The CEAPAD participants will review the progress of the above efforts and explore further measures to be taken for the promotion of the Palestinian private sector through working-level conferences.

- The discussion in the private sector promotion meeting will be reflected in the upcoming second CEAPAD ministerial meeting in Indonesia.

Annex II

List of human resources development programme

Indicated priority of assistance

No.	*Sector*	*Country*	*Programme*
1.	Water	Japan	Project for capacity strengthening for non-revenue water
			Technical assistance and capacity-building project for the Jericho sanitation project
2.	Tourism and antiquities	Indonesia	Training course on conservation and restoration of monuments and sites
		Japan	Project for sustainable tourism development through public-private partnership
		Thailand	Triangular cooperation project with Japan for Jericho's tourism development
3.	Agriculture	Indonesia	Triangular cooperation project with Japan
		Japan	Project on improved extension for value-added agriculture in Jordan Rift Valley
			Capacity-building project for agriculture promotion
			Capacity-building project in agricultural research and development
		Thailand	Not available
		Malaysia	Breeding and cross-breeding programmes for sheep breeds under field conditions
4.	Local governance	Japan	Project for improvement of local finance system
5.	Economic sector (including small and medium-sized enterprises, light manufacturing)	Indonesia	Training programme on business and technology incubator management
		Japan	Project for institutional strengthening of the management and services of the Jericho Agro-Industrial Park
			Project for institutional strengthening of business development services for small and medium-sized enterprises
			Capacity-building project for small and medium-sized enterprises promotion

No.	*Sector*	*Country*	*Programme*
		Thailand	Not available
		Malaysia	Small and medium enterprises management
6.	Vocational training	Japan	Capacity-building in firefighting and rescue techniques
		Thailand	Not available
		Republic of Korea	Project for the establishment of Jenin Industrial Secondary School
			Project for the establishment of Kufr Ni'ma Industrial Secondary School
7.	Finance	Malaysia	Tax Auditing
			Measuring the performance of the Supreme Audit Institution
			Monetary sector (any)
8.	Education	Singapore	Capacity-building programmes such as vocational education pedagogy and leadership development for educators
9.	Public administration	Singapore	Sharing of experience in anti-corruption strategies
10.	ICT	Indonesia	Information technology workshop for small and medium-sized enterprises
		Republic of Korea	Project for the establishment of An-Najah IT Institute of Excellence
			Project for the establishment of a smart building and ICT centre in Ramallah
12.	Infrastructure	Indonesia	Project cycle management training
		Japan	Project for capacity development on solid waste management
			Electricity capacity-building project

Annex III

Private sector development programme

No.	*Country/Entity*	*Programme*
1.	Indonesia	CEAPAD Business Forum and Trade Expo, 1-2 March 2014
		Assistance to participate in Indonesia Trade Expo, 2014
2.	Japan	Assistance for Palestinian companies to participate in the international food and beverage exhibition (FOODEX JAPAN) in March 2014
		Follow-up of assistance for exports of Palestinian skin-care products to Japan
		Dispatch of an official mission from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry to Palestine (February 2014) and its follow-up
		Programme for regional tourism promotion (March 2014)
		Fourth Japan-Arab economic forum (including Palestine)
3.	Islamic Development Bank	Organize thematic workshops involving NGOs, civil society and private sectors for developing exchange programme and twinning arrangements benefiting from expertise available from CEAPAD participating countries.

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Security Council

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Original: English

Letter dated 24 March 2014 from the Chair of the Central African Republic configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council

In my capacity as Chair of the Central African Republic configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, I visited Bangui from 4 to 7 March 2014. During this first visit, I held discussions with different stakeholders to seek their views on the priority aspects for the engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission in the Central African Republic in the light of the current political and security situation. The report of the visit is attached, for your consideration.*

I would like to thank the transitional authorities of the Central African Republic for their warm welcome, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Babacar Gaye, and his Office for all their assistance and continued support, and the Peacebuilding Support Office for its timely and substantive advice and support.

In the meantime, I remain at the disposal of the Security Council to provide further information and clarifications as may be required. The Peacebuilding Commission configuration is ready to accompany the Central African Republic and to inform the Council on developments relevant to peacebuilding, as appropriate.

I kindly request that the present letter be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed **Loulichki**
Chair of the Central African Republic configuration
of the Peacebuilding Commission

* The report was made available to the members of the Security Council only.

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Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2100 (2013), by which the Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and requested me to periodically update it on the situation in Mali and the implementation of the Mission's mandate. The present report covers the period from 22 December 2013 to 24 March 2014.

II. Political process

2. Since my previous report of 2 January 2014 (S/2014/1), Mali has progressed further in the restoration of constitutional order, as evidenced by the inauguration of the National Assembly in January. In addition, the Government and armed groups participated in informal seminars held in February under the auspices of the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, raising hope of progress towards cantonment and inclusive peace talks more than four months after the stalling of the process initiated by the preliminary agreement to the presidential election and the inclusive peace talks in Mali.

3. On 31 December, the Constitutional Court announced the final results of the legislative elections. The party of the President, the Rassemblement pour le Mali, fell short of an absolute majority, winning 66 of 147 seats. An opposition party, the Union pour la république et la démocratie, secured 18 seats, while the Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali won 16 seats. Fourteen women were elected. On 22 January, the National Assembly convened its first session and elected Issaka Sidibé, a member of the Rassemblement pour le Mali, as Speaker by 115 votes to 11. On 29 January, legislators adopted new rules of procedure that were validated by the Constitutional Court on 7 February, increasing the number of parliamentarians required to form a parliamentary group from 5 to 10. Five such groups were formed.

4. On 26 February, the Government extended the mandates of mayors and municipal councils until 27 October 2014 and postponed the municipal elections originally scheduled for April 2014 by six months, indicating that more time was required to implement reforms of local governance structures.

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Dialogue and reconciliation

5. As noted in my previous report, the parties made limited progress during the last quarter of 2013 in pursuing discussions within the framework designed in the preliminary agreement. There were, however, some encouraging developments during the reporting period in the wake of the statement by the President of the Security Council of 23 January (S/PRST/2014/2) and the visit of the Council to Mali (1-3 February).

6. The President of Mali, Boubacar Keita, began 2014 with bilateral meetings with the authorities of neighbouring countries, including on negotiations with the armed groups in the north of Mali. Algeria facilitated exploratory discussions with those groups, notably the Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad, the Coordination des mouvements et forces patriotiques de résistance and the Haut conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (HCUA), which led to the signing, on 16 January, of a cooperation platform for lasting peace in northern Mali. That initiative was followed by a visit by the President of Mali to Algiers on 18 and 19 January, during which the two Heads of State agreed to reinforce cooperation between the two countries in such areas as security, development and humanitarian assistance and to put in place a bilateral committee that would meet monthly to monitor the implementation of the decision pertaining to the peaceful settlement of the problem of north Mali. On 1 February, the King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, hosted a delegation from the Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) led by its Secretary-General, Bilal ag Cherif. From 19 to 23 February, the King made a State visit to Mali to discuss bilateral efforts to sustain peace and reconciliation and to strengthen economic ties. The President of Mali also visited Mauritania from 10 to 12 January.

7. During the visit by the Security Council to Mali, the Government unveiled elements of a road map to end the crisis. The document set out the following preparatory activities for the launch of the inclusive dialogue: three workshops (proposed in September by the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee with a view to building trust among the parties and finding a basis for an agreed way forward regarding formal inclusive peace talks), consultations with civil society, exploratory discussions under the auspices of Algeria and consultations with communities in the north.

8. MINUSMA facilitated the organization of the three workshops shortly after the visit of the Security Council. More than 50 participants attended, including representatives of the Government, local authorities, armed groups and civil society, in addition to members of the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee. The workshops held on 13 and 14 February focused on lessons learned from past peace processes and cantonment. The latter resulted in the adoption, on 18 February, of a technical document, signed by the representatives of all armed groups, the Government and the international community, in which the steps necessary to further the cantonment process were outlined. On 13 March, a third workshop focused on the return of State administration and basic services to the north. The parties having identified a need to evaluate the implementation of the preliminary agreement to date, MINUSMA facilitated another session, on 14 March, at which the participants established four working groups tasked with making recommendations for confidence-building measures, cantonment, return of State administration and basic services and the next steps for the inclusive dialogue, respectively. The preliminary conclusions of the working groups were shared with

the Government and participants on 20 March. Reactions are expected in the next two weeks, following consultations.

9. Meanwhile, on 18 March, a group of individuals, including MNLA dissidents, launched the Coalition du peuple pour l'Azawad, a new movement headed by the former head of external relations for MNLA and its representative on the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh. He had earlier announced his intention to form a new movement.

10. On 15 January, the Government established a truth, justice and reconciliation commission mandated to investigate major human rights violations between 1960 and 2013, foster reconciliation and consolidate national unity and democratic values. Established for three years, it replaces the National Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation established under the transition road map of 2013. Civil society and human rights organizations raised concerns about the independence, functioning and inclusiveness of the Commission, given that it was established and the process for selecting yet-to-be appointed commissioners was conducted without consultation with political parties or civil society. On 20 March, the National Assembly unanimously adopted a bill to ratify the ordinance creating the Commission. Before the vote, the parliamentary committee on constitutional laws, legislation, justice and the institutions of Mali shared observations relating to the structure and independence of the Commission. The Government gave assurances to the Commission that those observations would be taken into consideration in the decree on the implementation of the ordinance by the Cabinet.

11. On 25 February, the Ministry for the Advancement of Women, Children and the Family and the Ministry of National Reconciliation and Development of the North co-organized, with the support of MINUSMA, a two-day regional forum on women attended by 1,000 delegates, including representatives of Malian refugees in Burkina Faso, Mauritania and the Niger. The forum established a monitoring committee to oversee the socioeconomic reinsertion of women and children affected by the conflict and recommended that the Government should increase the participation of women in the political process.

III. Security and stabilization

A. Security situation

12. During the reporting period, the overall security situation deteriorated in northern Mali as a result of the increasing activity of terrorist groups, mainly Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'ouest, as exemplified by a series of rocket and improvised explosive device attacks targeting the Malian armed forces, MINUSMA and Operation Serval. The security situation remained particularly worrisome in Kidal, but rocket attacks also increased around Gao. Timbuktu suffered its first rocket attack after a period of relative calm. On 8 February, Bamako experienced its first alert for a possible vehicle-borne improvised explosive device.

13. While the number of rocket attacks increased notably since my previous report, no casualties were sustained. A total of 25 rockets were launched in 12 attacks in the vicinity of MINUSMA, Operation Serval and/or Malian armed

forces premises in northern Mali. More than 10 unexploded rockets were also discovered on launching sites. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'ouest claimed responsibility for several of the attacks. In addition, on 20 February, an Operation Serval helicopter patrolling the Tigargar desert (north-east of Tessalit) came under fire, slightly wounding a soldier. In the face of the increased rocket attacks, the Mission has launched compound protection works and adapted its plans for the future United Nations premises in the north.

14. On 28 December, a joint patrol by MINUSMA and Operation Serval in the area of Timetrine, Kidal region, 150 km south-west of Tessalit, discovered a weapons cache containing 700 kg of ammonium nitrate and 46 grenades. The material, which appeared to have been abandoned, was destroyed on the same day. On 29 December, a similar cache containing 5 tons of ammonium nitrate was discovered, and subsequently destroyed, 10 km south of the first site. The French forces indicated that it was the second-largest weapons cache discovery since the beginning of Operation Serval, a sign that terrorist groups continue to have the means to conduct large-scale operations.

15. Amid an increased fragmentation of armed groups, in particular MNLA, terrorist groups abducted, assassinated and ambushed MNLA and HCUA supporters in the Kidal region between 13 and 19 January. During the night of 13 to 14 January, a HCUA vehicle was ambushed on the road to Aguelhok, some 100 km from Kidal, and a HCUA member allegedly killed. In the early hours of 14 January, a MNLA senior political representative, Abounahiya Ag Attayoub, was kidnapped by armed men at his residence in Tessalit. His family later reported that Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb had announced that he had died of sickness on 14 January. On 17 January, a local MNLA chief was assassinated in Talhandak. On 19 January, another MNLA fighter was allegedly abducted from a camp near Abeibara and executed.

16. Abductions and banditry contributed to perpetrating a climate of fear in northern Mali. Four civilians were reportedly abducted in Kidal region in February. On 8 February, five persons, including four national staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross, were kidnapped while travelling from Anefis to Gao. The Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'ouest later claimed responsibility. Meanwhile, armed banditry continued to plague the principal transportation routes in the north. On 17 February, some 300 miners left the Taoudenni salt mine, 800 km north of Timbuktu, for Timbuktu after being threatened by unidentified armed men.

17. The incidence of improvised explosive device attacks increased during the reporting period. On 20 January, a MINUSMA patrol hit a device on the road to Aguelhok in Kidal region, injuring five Chadian peacekeepers. On 14 February, livestock triggered a device at a site regularly used by MINUSMA, close to Tessalit, Kidal region. On 26 February, a vehicle belonging to an international non-governmental organization hit a device while parking alongside the Kidal airstrip, seriously wounding a passenger and slightly injuring the driver. On 9 March, a Malian armed forces patrol struck a device in the region of Gao, injuring five of its members. On 11 March, an Operation Serval vehicle hit a device near Aguelhok, slightly injuring a passenger. On 16 March, a MINUSMA convoy hit a device close to Aguelhok, injuring two Chadian peacekeepers.

18. Intercommunal violence between the Tuareg and the Fulani in Gao region worsened during the reporting period. According to a survivor of an attack that took place on 6 February near Tamkoutak (about 120 km north-east of Gao), a group of Tuareg returning from a trade fair were ambushed by armed Fulani on 30 motorcycles. MINUSMA sent a military detachment and a human rights fact-finding mission that reported that 24 Tuareg had been killed at the scene and another had died later of injuries sustained in the attack. On 7 and 8 February, MINUSMA received reports of possible reprisal attacks further south in the region, with two victims receiving treatment at Gao hospital reporting fighting on 7 February in Tin Hama commune, Ansongo area. Confrontations also reportedly broke out on 8 February in nearby Amalaoulaou, about 180 km south-east of Gao (near the border between Mali and the Niger). The Malian armed forces reported clashes during the night of 9 to 10 February between Fulani and Tuareg in Akabar, south-west of Ménaka, also close to the border with the Niger. On 11 February, the Malian armed forces reported discovering the bodies of 17 Tuareg killed in Akabar.

19. The Malian armed forces continued to redeploy to the north, with the European Union Training Mission in Mali completing the training of a fourth battalion during the reporting period. Efforts to increase the presence of the armed forces in the north notwithstanding, some areas — for example, Taoudenni, 800 km north of Timbuktu, Abeibara and Tinessako, north-east and east of Kidal, respectively, and more generally the borders with Algeria and the Niger — are not yet covered.

20. Within its current capacity, MINUSMA has taken measures to contribute to a more secure environment in key population centres in the north. The Mission's military and police personnel conduct day and night patrols in Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal and carry out long-range patrols in surrounding areas. The Mission's ability to proactively protect civilians and deter attacks remains limited, however, given the lack of manoeuvre units, key enablers and force multipliers such as military transport helicopters.

B. Mine action

21. On 21 February, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) completed the refurbishment of a training facility near Bamako. It will begin training the explosive ordnance disposal companies from Cambodia and Nepal in March. The seven-week course includes evaluation, planning and conduct of clearance operations, technical training in the use of bomb disposal and other specialized equipment procured by the United Nations and essential medical training.

22. In addition, UNMAS coordinated and tasked eight explosive ordnance disposal teams with the surveying, marking and clearing of dangerous areas in the Mopti, Ségou, Timbuktu and Gao regions. Since 22 December, 228 villages have been surveyed and 87 items of unexploded ordinance and 2,830 items of small arms ammunition destroyed, including through a pilot programme with a local mine action operator in Kidal.

23. On 10 January, UNMAS handed over explosive ordnance disposal equipment to the Malian armed forces following the completion of their training by the European Union Training Mission. The equipment, the first of its kind in their possession, will allow the armed forces to carry out explosive ordnance disposal

operations in the north. At the request of the armed forces, UNMAS initiated, on 27 March, the destruction of more than 10,000 weapons and some 60 tons of obsolete ammunition, an operation that will exceed the explosive ordnance disposal capacity of the armed forces but be undertaken in conjunction with trainees as part of practical capacity-building. In early March, 21 armed forces personnel began 12 weeks of training in weapons and ammunition inspection at the Gendarmerie Training Centre in Bamako and 20 others followed with a four-week, level one training course in explosive ordnance disposal at the Humanitarian Demining Training Centre in Benin.

C. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

24. During the reporting period, the cantonment and disarmament of armed groups in the north made no progress, given that no meetings of the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee and the Mixed Technical Commission on Security have been held since October 2013. The parties were unable to overcome disagreements on the interpretation of the preliminary agreement and the inclusion of the adherent groups, the Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad and the Coordination des mouvements et forces patriotiques de résistance, in the process. Meanwhile, MINUSMA continued to provide logistical support, food and water to three pilot pre-cantonment sites in the Kidal region for 1,847 adult men listed by MNLA and HCUA, as earlier agreed by the Mixed Technical Commission on Security.

25. On 10 February, the Government and the Peacebuilding Support Office endorsed a Peacebuilding Fund project in the amount of $3 million that will enable the implementing partner, the United Nations Office for Project Services, to begin the construction and ensure the full functioning of the above-mentioned pilot pre-cantonment sites. The project also aims at building confidence between the Government and the armed groups, creating space for further political dialogue.

26. On 18 February, four days after the above-mentioned cantonment workshop (see para. 8), the Government and the signatory armed groups, MNLA and HCUA, in addition to the adherent armed groups, the Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad and the Coordination des mouvements et forces patriotiques de résistance, signed a document reflecting a common understanding of the operational modalities for cantonment by all parties and identifying roles, responsibilities and mechanisms for implementation. On 14 March, during discussions in the context of the working groups referred to in paragraph 8, the parties discussed the modalities for conducting reconnaissance and validation visits of the cantonment sites, the establishment of a coordination cell, security arrangements inside and outside the cantonment sites and a timeline for the implementation of the arrangements.

IV. Re-establishment of State authority

27. While the governors of Kidal, Timbuktu, Mopti and Gao and all 135 prefects and subprefects have returned to the four northern regions, few prefects and subprefects, gendarmes or police officers have taken up posts outside the principal towns owing to the security conditions and the lack of infrastructure and resources, leaving significant gaps in State authority in rural areas. In Kidal, for example, the risk of terrorist attacks against government institutions remained high and

gendarmes and police officers were mostly confined to their camps, while 17 prefects and subprefects assigned to the region remained based in Kidal city.

A. Security sector reform

28. On 30 December, under the auspices of the President, the Minister of Internal Security and Civil Protection presided over the official launch of a multidisciplinary working group on security sector reform, which was tasked with, within three months, developing elements of a national vision for the security sector reform process, making recommendations on implementation processes and structures for the reform at the national and sectoral levels and identifying national mechanisms and international partners for funding the reform process. On 19 February, the President announced that the Government would soon introduce a bill for the funding of the defence sector reform process, which would be submitted to the National Assembly for approval.

29. The multidisciplinary working group on security sector reform first met on 6 January and established three subgroups: one on the elements of the national vision for security sector reform; one on the process and structures of the reform; and the third on resource mobilization mechanisms for the reform. They presented their progress reports on 5 March during the sixth plenary session of the working group, chaired by the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection. During a meeting on 19 March, the Secretary-General of the Ministry indicated that the update had been shared with the Government, which was expected to make a midterm report available by 2 April. The Government indicated that it would subsequently convene a national convention on security with the aim of reviewing and validating the vision, architecture and resource mobilization elements and officially launching the security sector reform process.

B. Law enforcement, justice and corrections institutions

30. Since my previous report, the presence of justice and corrections personnel in the north has remained limited, with only a number of modest steps forward. The two higher-instance courts in Gao and Timbuktu reopened on 3 and 12 February, respectively, followed in the same month by the reopening of the two main prisons there. At the same time, significant challenges remain, given that 11 courts and 11 prisons in Mopti, Gao and Timbuktu have yet to reopen. Only 60 of 104 judicial officers (magistrates, prosecutors and registrars) have returned to the four regions of the north, while only 51 of an estimated 204 penitentiary system posts are occupied. In Kidal, the redeployment of judicial and corrections authorities continued to be hindered by insecurity. In the absence of credible and functional penal institutions, disputes continued to be settled through traditional mechanisms.

31. On 23 January, the Ministry of Justice, MINUSMA, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Union established a technical working group that meets weekly as part of efforts to re-establish justice institutions in the north. MINUSMA and the Ministry continued to carry out needs assessments of judicial and corrections facilities in the north. Existing corrections facilities were found to be inadequate owing to the lack of medical supplies, poor water drainage systems and, most critically, the absence of any distinction between pretrial and

sentenced inmates and the lack of separate premises for juvenile male and female inmates. At the same time, MINUSMA and UNDP launched a joint project aimed at rehabilitating and providing equipment to four courthouses, four prefectures, two gendarmerie barracks and a police station in Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal.

32. From 16 to 21 February, MINUSMA, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom and the International Institute of Human Rights organized a workshop on international criminal law and human rights law to strengthen the capacity of the Malian judicial authorities. Some 100 Malian judicial and law enforcement officials attended, along with 50 participants from 17 countries.

33. A total of 1,211 gendarmes and police officers have been deployed to the north to date, compared with 469 before the crisis. That increase follows the redeployment programme established by the Malian authorities to transfer law and order responsibilities from the armed forces to law enforcement institutions. Eleven MINUSMA police trainers based at the police and gendarmerie training schools recently refurbished by MINUSMA trained 848 police officers and gendarmes during the reporting period.

V. Human rights and protection of civilians

A. Human rights

34. MINUSMA continued to document serious human rights violations and abuses by elements of the Malian armed forces and by armed groups in the northern regions. On 19 February, three civilians were arrested, tied up, summarily executed and buried in a mass grave, allegedly by elements of the Malian forces deployed in Djebock (Gao region). The authorities have opened an investigation into this case.

35. MINUSMA continued to observe a growing trend of arrest and detention of members of the Tuareg and Arab communities on suspicion of alleged collaboration with the armed groups during the crisis. Between 1 January and 12 March, the Mission documented 63 new arrests (48 in Gao and 15 in Timbuktu) of individuals suspected of being members of armed groups. There is concern that such arrests may result in the stigmatization of such communities and therefore affect the reconciliation process. Of the 481 individuals arrested on conflict-related charges since April 2013, 94 remain detained, awaiting trial, in Bamako, Gao and Timbuktu. MINUSMA maintains nationwide access to all detention facilities except those under the control of State security in Bamako.

36. On 13 and 14 February, four former junta leaders were arrested and charged, some with murder and abduction and others with complicity to murder and abduction, in relation to the disappearance and summary execution of 25 soldiers following the counter-coup d'état of April 2012. On 24 February, five bodies dressed in military attire were found in a grave in the vicinity of the Kati military camp (20 km from Bamako). Another body was found in a well near the camp on 1 March.

37. From 17 to 26 February, MINUSMA supported the second visit of the United Nations Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali. He welcomed the positive steps taken by the Malian authorities to address the human rights violations committed by the former junta and underlined the importance of

accountability for the violations of international human rights and humanitarian law committed by the parties since the beginning of the conflict in the north of the country.

38. During the reporting period, the judiciary failed to move forward on criminal investigations into several key human rights cases, such as the incidents of intercommunal violence of 6-8 February in Gao. No specific progress has been made to date regarding the implementation of article 18 of the preliminary agreement, which provides for the creation of an international commission of inquiry to investigate grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law committed in the country.

B. Protection of civilians

39. In addition to the regular military and police patrols coordinated with the Malian armed forces and Operation Serval, MINUSMA carried out short-range and long-range (multi-day) patrols in rural areas marked by or at risk of violence. It also carried out integrated assessment visits with civilian, military and police personnel to high-risk areas to identify sources of tension and recommend conflict-management responses for MINUSMA and the national authorities. For example, MINUSMA conducted a three-day visit to Léré and Lerneb, near the Mauritanian border, from 17 to 21 February to gather information on the political, security and human rights situation. The visit underscored the need for MINUSMA to strengthen its presence in that sensitive area.

40. The Mission also developed integrated mechanisms to respond to tension and violence between communities in the north. MINUSMA force, police and civilian components have set up a joint task force capable of rapid deployment for extended periods to areas at risk of intercommunal violence, beginning in the Gao-Ménaka zone. The intercommunal violence between Imghad Tuareg and Fulani that killed at least 25 Tuareg on 6 February is the result of a complex set of factors, including long-standing tensions between the communities, augmented by economic and humanitarian hardship, the limited presence of the State and the presence of armed groups and terrorist organizations. Although MINUSMA continued to have a limited military, civilian and police presence in the areas concerned, it organized a multidimensional response to help to prevent additional reprisals, working with the Government and the communities to develop conflict-management strategies. From 17 to 19 March, the Governments of Mali and the Niger organized a meeting of community leaders of both countries in an effort to address long-standing intercommunal tension and foster reconciliation.

C. Child protection

41. MINUSMA and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have urged the Government of Mali to release detained children immediately and transfer them to the UNICEF-supported transit and care centre and to drop all security and terrorism charges against children. On 28 February, a court dropped terrorism charges against three boys who had been released from detention in August 2013 and were in temporary care at the centre, allowing them to be reunited with their families. Four boys have been reunited with their families since my previous report, for a total of

16 since 1 October 2013. Ten boys formerly associated with armed groups remained in the centre as at 12 March.

42. At the same time, in spite of the continued advocacy by the United Nations notwithstanding, nine boys remained in detention in Bamako on security and terrorism charges (three at the central prison, another two in the high-security section of the prison and four at Gendarmerie Camp 1). In addition, two male detainees in the high-security section of the prison claimed that they were children upon their arrest in October 2011 and January 2012, respectively. They spent 11 months in detention at the State security premises, where they claim to have been tortured, before being transferred to the prison.

VI. Early recovery and development

43. The delivery of basic social services such as health, water and electricity improved during the reporting period. For example, the electricity supply in the north was enhanced, although it does not allow for permanent distribution everywhere. In Gao city, electricity is available for between 18 and 24 hours per day, compared with 17 hours in Timbuktu city. In Kidal city, MINUSMA is supporting the delivery of electricity for between four and five hours per day.

44. Seven new projects totalling $3.2 million were approved by the project review committee for the Trust Fund in Support of Peace and Security in Mali managed by MINUSMA. They include projects to support the redeployment of State administration, including rehabilitation of key facilities in the north, and to support mediation and reconciliation efforts. Of the $11 million pledged, $9,418,715 has been committed. Among projects currently under discussion with the Government is one to provide electricity in Kidal in partnership with the Governorate of Kidal, the electricity company and competent ministries.

45. MINUSMA approved seven new quick-impact projects in the amount of some $330,000 during the reporting period. The implementation of previously approved projects continued. Quick-impact projects strengthened the Mission's relationship with local communities and contributed to the implementation of Mission priorities, including the further rehabilitation and return of State functions in the north and the restoration of gendarmerie and police stations in Timbuktu, Gao, Niafunké and Goundam, as well as advanced economic opportunities for and livelihoods of the local population, through the rehabilitation of water and lighting facilities and the provision of support to income-generating activities by women's associations in the Gao and Timbuktu regions.

46. In the region of Timbuktu, United Nations agencies, including UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the International Labour Organization, have initiated a joint programme on youth and resilience to create employment opportunities for young people and vulnerable groups through microfinance schemes, cash-for-work programmes and other income-generating activities, with a total budget of $5 million to be mobilized. Projects launched to date include a youth centre that is being rehabilitated with the involvement of young people from Timbuktu and an economic opportunities study undertaken with a focus on youth employment opportunities in the region.

47. On 11 February, the Ministry of Culture and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization conducted a joint assessment mission to Gao. The experts found that the Tomb of Askia, a World Heritage site, would require major conservation work before the coming rainy season to prevent further deterioration. The work is to be conducted by the local community and earthen architecture conservation specialists as from May. On 14 March, during a ceremony in Timbuktu to mark the official launch of reconstruction work on the heritage of Mali, UNESCO presented its strategy for the reconstruction of the mausoleums, setting out the activities to be undertaken over the coming four years to ensure the complete rehabilitation of the damaged sites. In January, MINUSMA provided logistical support for the return to Timbuktu of personnel from the Ahmed Baba Centre for Documentation and Research in charge of researching and preserving the country's ancient manuscripts.

48. Integration efforts by MINUSMA with the United Nations country team continued on the basis of a joint action plan that serves as an integrated strategic framework. A monitoring and evaluation mechanism has been formulated so as to jointly assess results on a monthly basis. The development of joint programmes is under discussion with a view to ensuring coherence and realizing clear gains in the effectiveness and efficiency of United Nations action. The MINUSMA and UNDP rule of law activities are closely coordinated under the global focal point arrangement. In the region of Timbuktu, MINUSMA and UNDP have launched a coordinated rule of law initiative to rehabilitate courthouses, gendarmeries, police station and prisons.

49. Economic recovery picked up in 2013, with estimated growth of 5.1 per cent, and a projection of 6.2 per cent for 2014, largely owing to the revitalization of activities in the industrial (especially construction) and tertiary (transport, communication, trade, hotels) sectors. The recent agricultural season, however, was poor compared with previous years, in particular in terms of cereal production, which may lead to a downward revision of growth estimates.

VII. Humanitarian situation

50. Food insecurity and malnutrition remain a major concern in Mali. Data from malnutrition surveys project that 500,000 children under the age of 5 will suffer from acute malnutrition in 2014, 136,000 of whom from the most severe form. Overall, as at the end of March, 3.3 million people were food insecure, including 970,000 who were severely affected. While the financial requirement for the nutrition response in 2014 is $77 million, donors had, as at 12 March, made no pledges towards the nutrition sector.

51. The strategic response plan for Mali was launched on 26 February, aiming to mobilize $568 million to meet identified humanitarian and early recovery needs. The increase from $477 million in 2013 was mainly due to the inclusion of early recovery and increased needs in the food security sector. It is part of a broader three-year strategic humanitarian plan for the Sahel that aims to strengthen the resilience capacity of the region's population and better address the root causes of cyclical food security and nutrition crises.

52. Burkina Faso, Mauritania and the Niger continue to host some 170,000 Malian refugees registered by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees (compared with 177,000 at the height of displacement in May 2013). According to the International Organization for Migration displacement tracking matrix, there were nearly 200,000 internally displaced persons in Mali as at 18 February, some 150,000 less than at the peak of displacement in 2012. Internally displaced persons are returning to urban centres in the north, but are reluctant to return to their homes in rural areas.

53. Access to water has been affected, in particular in Kidal where the activities of the water utility were seriously disrupted by the lack of maintenance of infrastructure and the absence of technical staff. In response, UNICEF and its partners rehabilitated eight boreholes in Kidal city. Access to water has largely been restored in Gao and Timbuktu regions.

54. More than 167,000 pupils have been able to return to school in the conflict-affected areas, representing 83 per cent of school-age children enrolled before the crisis. As at 29 January, UNICEF had provided assistance to 115,000 pupils in the north. To date, more than 72 per cent of northern schools have reopened, an increase of 20 per cent compared with the 2012-2013 school year. Schools in the Kidal region, however, remained severely affected by the continuing insecurity and the lack of teachers, with only 5 per cent of schools having reopened since March 2012. Some 88 per cent of the northern health facilities are functional, mostly with support provided by humanitarian organizations, compared with 77 per cent during the previous reporting period. By 31 December, 7,191,552 children had been vaccinated, reaching 100 per cent coverage in all regions except Kidal (62 per cent).

VIII. Establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

55. As at 18 March, the military strength of MINUSMA stood at 6,443 personnel, including 50 women, or 57 per cent of the authorized strength of 11,200. In view of the stable security situation south of the river Niger and the volatile situation in key locations in the north, MINUSMA is reconsidering the force layout to enhance its projection along the Mauritanian border and in Gao and Kidal regions.

56. An additional 865 troops, including a second level II hospital, were deployed during the reporting period. The engineering capacity of the Mission was enhanced with the arrival of a construction engineer company, an airfield engineer company and two explosive ordnance disposal companies. The advance party and the contingent-owned equipment of an infantry battalion, two signal companies, an engineer company, a riverine unit and a transport company have already arrived in Mali. An additional infantry battalion, a reserve battalion and a military police company, although identified, have yet to be deployed. Engineering works for the construction of the Gao camps are under way. Letters of assist for the extension of runways in Gao and Timbuktu and for the horizontal construction of modularized bases in Gao, Kidal and Tessalit were signed on 12 March. In addition, the contract for the construction of the modularized base in Timbuktu was signed on 19 March; mobilization activities have begun for the construction to start in mid-April.

57. The Mission's insufficient medical capability and air mobility remain of concern. The Mission relies on Operation Serval forces for medical evacuations and for the provision of on-call close air support. To date, MINUSMA has no military

helicopters, which are essential force multipliers, and no medical evacuation enablers. I intend to explore the possibility of sourcing these critical assets through inter-mission cooperation in accordance with paragraph 14 of resolution 2100 (2013), as a temporary measure until the Mission's own military helicopter capabilities have been deployed.

58. The transfer of equipment sourced by the Trust Fund in Support of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali continued during the reporting period, with eight vehicles and 96 containers of field defence stores, accommodation units, generators and other supplies. The provision of such equipment is enhancing the overall logistical capacity of former military and police personnel of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali, although they continue to face significant self-sustainment challenges.

59. The Mission's police strength has held steady since my previous report. As at 5 March, 957 police personnel, including 50 women, of the authorized total of 1,440 had been deployed, comprising 73 individual police officers (23 per cent of the authorized 320) and 884 formed police unit elements (of the authorized 1,120). Efforts are under way to address the recruitment backlog of individual police officers through the prioritization of specific skill sets. Six of the eight authorized formed police units are currently deployed.

60. The Mission has filled 365 of its authorized 672 international civilian posts, including 121 women (33 per cent of international civilian staff on board), 64 of its 145 authorized United Nations volunteer positions, with 27 female United Nations volunteers (42 per cent of United Nations volunteer positions), and 216 of its authorized 781 national posts, with 66 female national staff on board amounting to 30 per cent of national staff as at 18 March.

IX. International coordination

61. The Prime Minister of Mali and other ministers, representatives of the European Union, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the African Union and other major bilateral and multilateral partners took part in the second follow-up meeting to the Donor Conference for Development in Mali, held in Brussels on 5 February. The participants reaffirmed the importance of an inclusive dialogue between the Malian authorities and northern armed groups and communities to achieve sustainable peace and development in Mali.

62. On 16 February, the Governments of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger established what is known as the "Group of Five for the Sahel" to reinforce cooperation on security challenges in the region. On 17 February, the African Union, the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States, the United Nations Office for West Africa and MINUSMA sent senior representatives to the fourth meeting of the heads of intelligence and security services of the countries of the Sahelo-Saharan region, held in Niamey. The participants exchanged views on ways to further enhance security cooperation and build capacity to fight terrorism and cross-border crime and stressed that there was a risk that terrorist groups could exacerbate institutional weaknesses and intercommunal tensions, in particular in northern Mali.

63. The third ministerial meeting on the enhancement of security cooperation and the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahelo-Saharan region was held in Niamey on 19 February. While welcoming the progress made in the implementation of the preliminary agreement, especially the recent progress on cantonment, the participants urged the Malian parties to continue efforts within the framework established under the preliminary agreement and encouraged all relevant partners to continue to lend their support to the Government of Mali and other stakeholders, on the basis of national ownership and leadership.

X. Financial aspects

64. The General Assembly, by its resolution 68/259, appropriated the amount of $602 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014, inclusive of the amount of $366.8 million previously authorized for the Mission for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2013 under the terms of its resolution 67/286.

65. As at 21 March 2014, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINUSMA amounted to $215.4 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $1,568.5 million.

66. As at 21 March 2014, reimbursement of troop/formed police units costs had been made for the period up to 28 February 2014, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment had been made for the period up to 31 December 2013, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

XI. Observations

67. The near-completion of the return to constitutional order with the inauguration of the National Assembly, the gradual return of State administration to the north and the renewal of informal discussions between the Government and armed groups after a lengthy impasse are encouraging developments. Combined with substantial support from the international community, including MINUSMA and donors, they offer a historic chance for all Malians to overcome the current crisis and achieve a lasting social and political contract with the north. I call upon the Government, the armed groups and all civil society actors to grasp this moment collectively and build on this positive dynamic. The window of opportunity to consolidate and sustain peace and stability in Mali stands wide open, but may also close unless sustained commitment by all stakeholders is upheld.

68. The first priority is a truly inclusive political dialogue, as indicated in Security Council resolution 2100 (2013) and the preliminary agreement. There will be no durable solution to the security challenges in the north without an inclusive political process that paves the way for the full restoration of law and order, equal access by all Malians to public services and reconciliation between communities.

69. It is vital that the full spectrum of Malian society remain involved in this endeavour, including the Government, armed groups and civil society actors, including women's groups. Key players should actively participate in all efforts to chart the next steps towards restoring peace and security and I welcome the recent progress made through the informal seminars facilitated by my Special

Representative. I regret that some armed groups have shown a lack of coherence or declined to fully seize the opportunity presented by the informal discussions to shape the peace process. The next steps will require continued commitment on the part of all stakeholders to engaging in a meaningful and inclusive process, given that the current informal talks must shift to formal negotiations. I urge the Government to launch the formal negotiations without delay and the armed groups and civil society to participate in the interest of peace and security in Mali and the wider region.

70. I welcome the efforts of the Government of Mali to mobilize all segments of civil society, including through the regional forum on women held in Bamako on 25 and 26 February. Communities should have the opportunity to express their expectations and concerns with regard to the re-establishment of State authority and the provision of public services. My Special Representative for Mali, in coordination with ECOWAS and the African Union, the European Union and other key partners, will continue to support such efforts in the framework of Security Council resolution 2100 (2013) and the preliminary agreement.

71. The countries of the region have made significant efforts to support the peace process in Mali. Their role remains crucial. I call upon all regional actors to ensure a coordinated approach and concerted action with the United Nations and in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 2100 (2013) and the preliminary agreement to accompany the inclusive talks and negotiations with the signatories to that agreement.

72. I am encouraged that the parties, who are responsible for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, have made progress in defining the modalities for further cantonment. The parties to the preliminary agreement hold primary responsibility for this process. The United Nations will support the process and assist in ensuring the integrity of cantonment and its supervision. I call upon regional and global partners to step up their efforts to assist the parties in the implementation of the process, including through much-needed financial and logistical support.

73. I remain deeply concerned by the deteriorating security situation in the north, especially the increased presence and activity of extremist groups. In this context, the continued lack of military transport helicopters for MINUSMA remains a significant concern, given that it hampers the Mission's mobility and emergency-response capabilities in this vast area. I therefore once again urge Member States to accelerate the generation and deployment of helicopters and other key enablers, in addition to troops, for MINUSMA and call upon the international community to provide increased support to the Malian security forces. I wish to thank the French forces for the crucial support extended to MINUSMA and look forward to its continuation in the context of transitional arrangements and in accordance with Security Council resolution 2100 (2013). I further encourage all donors to make unearmarked contributions to the Trust Fund in Support of Peace and Security in Mali in line with the resolution.

74. I am deeply concerned by the clashes between communities in the north, particularly in the Gao region. Urgent action is required to prevent such confrontations from escalating. In that regard, I call upon the Malian authorities and local actors to continue to promote dialogue between communities and deploy civilian authorities, including the police, to the rural areas marked by growing

tensions. My Special Representative for Mali and MINUSMA stand ready to support such efforts.

75. The successful conduct of the legislative elections was a remarkable achievement for which I commend the Malian authorities and people. It represented a major milestone for the country, with conditions now conducive to implementing much-needed reforms. I urge the Government and all political stakeholders in the National Assembly to expedite institutional reforms to enhance the legitimacy, transparency and fairness of the national governance, security and judicial systems. In this regard, I welcome the progress made in the launch of the multidisciplinary working group on security sector reform.

76. Although some refugees and internally displaced persons have returned to their areas of origin, I encourage the Government to accelerate inclusive dialogue and local reconciliation and, with support from its partners, to ensure the availability of the humanitarian assistance and basic services needed to facilitate the sustainable return of all displaced Malians to their communities. In this regard, I call upon development partners to support the return of State administration and basic social services in the north and to provide increased assistance to the 3 million individuals affected by food insecurity, including the 500,000 children under the age of 5 suffering from acute malnutrition.

77. The establishment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission is a welcome development. I call upon the Government to ensure the neutrality, impartiality and independence of that body. The initiation by the judiciary of legal proceedings in relation to the disappearance and summary execution of 25 soldiers in April 2012 is also an encouraging step, as is the investigation into the alleged arbitrary arrest and summary execution of three civilians by elements of the Malian forces on 19 February. I urge the Malian authorities to similarly investigate all reported violations of human rights and international humanitarian law since the beginning of the Malian conflict.

78. I welcome the continued engagement of and support provided by the European Union through the organization of a high-level meeting on the Sahel in Brussels and the second follow-up meeting to the Donor Conference for Development in Mali. I urge the international community to provide financial and political support for the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel in the identified priority areas of governance, security, resilience and regional infrastructure. The continued engagement and coordination of the international community are crucial to aligning our action and to maximizing the impact of our efforts in Mali. The implementation of a final peace agreement and the effectiveness of development spending are directly related and illustrate the close nexus between development and security.

79. Lastly, I should like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative for Mali, Albert Gerard Koenders, for his leadership and steadfast support to the Government and people of Mali, and to all United Nations civilian and uniformed personnel for their commitment to restoring lasting peace and stability in the country. I should also like to thank all troop- and police-contributing countries, the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union and bilateral partners, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, non-governmental organizations and all other partners for their important contributions to supporting the peace process in Mali.



Map No. 4506 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS
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Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2014/230

Security Council

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28 March 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 19 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, hosted a workshop entitled "The Contribution of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) to Regional and Global Disarmament and Non-Proliferation", on 11 and 12 March in Astana. In view of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), the workshop was devoted to assessing the current status of the resolution's implementation, as well as the way forward in achieving its objectives.

Delegations from more than 30 countries in Central Asia and seven international organizations participated in the workshop.

As the Chair of this workshop, the Government of Kazakhstan has taken note of the following issues, which were raised during the proceedings:

- Next to the multilateral treaties to eliminate, or prevent the proliferation of, nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) plays a pivotal role in the current global security and non-proliferation architecture;
- Since the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) in 2004, the national and regional implementation efforts have led to significant progress towards the full and effective implementation of its key requirements;
- The tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) presents a unique opportunity for all relevant stakeholders to promote its effective and universal implementation based on effective national measures supported by strong international and regional cooperation;
- International and regional cooperation among States is an important instrument in achieving the key objectives of the resolution, and enhanced cooperation within the framework of the resolution should continue to be promoted and strengthened;
- The role of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) is crucial in supporting the national, regional and international efforts to implement key requirements of resolution 1540 (2004);

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- The indispensable role of relevant international, regional and subregional organizations in promoting and facilitating 1540 implementation efforts by their respective Member States is recognized;
- In order to implement resolution 1540 (2004) effectively, States that have requests for assistance are encouraged to convey them to the 1540 Committee. States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations that are able to provide assistance are encouraged to do so with the support of the 1540 Committee;
- Efforts to build synergies with key stakeholders, including States, international, regional and subregional organizations and, where relevant, civil society and industry, in support of national and international 1540 implementation are important;
- Progress towards achieving the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summits process is a significant contribution to the implementation of a number of key requirements of resolution 1540 (2004).

I would be grateful if you could have the present letter circulated to all Member States as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kairat **Abdrakhmanov**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/68/824–S/2014/231

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
2 April 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 34
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 28 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, dated 27 March 2014, regarding the twenty-seventh round of the Geneva international discussions (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kaha **Imnadze**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 28 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia regarding the twenty-seventh round of the Geneva international discussions

The twenty-seventh round of the Geneva international discussions was held on 26 March 2014. The participants in the Geneva discussions took part, in their individual capacity, in the two Working Groups, the first focusing on security and stability in the occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia, and the second on the issues related to the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons and refugees to the places of their permanent residence in the Russian-occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia. The discussions were co-chaired by the representatives of the European Union, the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and attended by participants from Georgia, the Russian Federation and the United States. The Head of the Provisional Administration of the former South Ossetian Autonomous District and the Chairman of the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, as well as representatives of the Sokhumi and Tskhinvali occupation regimes, took part in the twenty-seventh round of the Geneva discussions.

On 25 March, an information session was held, on "public health issues". The invited expert familiarized the participants with the principal determinants of health, including the importance of access to health services. In the course of the meeting within Working Group I, the alarming security situation on the ground — continued build-up of the military infrastructure, military training, violations of the airspace controlled by the Georgian Government, armed attacks and increased practices of kidnapping, as well as other provocative incidents — were brought to the attention of the co-Chairs.

In the framework of Working Group I, the Georgian participants raised their serious concern over the resumption of the installation of barbed-wire fences and other artificial obstacles by the Russian occupation forces along the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region. Since February 2014, Russia's illegal activities on the sovereign territory of Georgia in flagrant breach of the norms and principles of international law and the Ceasefire Agreement of 12 August 2008 have been resumed in the villages of Atotsi and Ghogheti of the Kareli district after being temporarily suspended during the Sochi Olympics. This provocative policy poses a serious threat to the security situation on the ground, causes a humanitarian crisis and does not contribute to the de-escalation of relations between Georgia and Russia. After our numerous calls upon the Russian Federation to reverse its destructive actions against Georgia and fulfil the Ceasefire Agreement of 12 August 2008, we strongly appeal to the international community to activate its diplomatic and political clout in the face of the ongoing provocations and address the security and humanitarian consequences of these alarming developments. The present security context in the occupied regions of Georgia underscores the particular importance of the reinforced presence of the European Union Monitoring Mission and stresses the necessity of ensuring the Mission's access to both regions in line with its mandate.

During the twenty-seventh round, the participants addressed one of the central items of the agenda pertaining to the non-use of force. Georgia remains fully committed to the Ceasefire Agreement of 12 August 2008, stressing the non-use of force, which is continuously disregarded by the Russian Federation. Georgia's commitment has been further strengthened by its unilateral legally binding non-use of force pledge, undertaken in 2010 and reiterated by the Parliament of Georgia in 2013. During the last few rounds, Georgian participants have been constructively engaged in the process of drafting, on the expert level, a draft statement by the participants in the Geneva international discussions on the non-use of force, initiated by the co-Chairs. We have spared no effort to advance the drafting process, while clearly stressing that this statement should in no way substitute for a legally binding commitment from the Russian Federation on the non-use of force. Today, in the context of the mounting assertiveness of the Russian Federation aimed at preventing neighbouring countries from seeking their free foreign policy choice, and violating their territorial integrity and political independence, its legally binding non-use of force commitment in relation to Georgia remains imperative; it would constitute a vital mechanism averting Moscow's further aggression.

Furthermore, in the light of the alarming developments in the region, Georgia appeals to the co-Chairs and their respective organizations to double their efforts with the aim of ensuring the establishment of international security arrangements. Only the creation of valid and effective international mechanisms in the occupied regions can safeguard Georgia's unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty.

In Working Group II, Georgian participants brought to the attention of the co-Moderators the persisting violations of human rights in the occupied Tskhinvali and Abkhazia regions and focused on the concrete humanitarian consequences of Russia's illegal activities along the occupation line and in the adjacent areas. In addition, concrete examples of the restriction of freedom of movement and the right to education and health have been extensively discussed. It was stressed that local residents, regardless of their ethnic origins, should exercise their social, economic and cultural rights, and, inter alia, enjoy freedom of movement, right to education in their native language and health care. To this end, the Georgian participants placed great emphasis on the importance of the creation of human rights monitoring mechanisms in the occupied regions.

Within Working Group II, the Georgian participants emphasized the importance of preserving the monuments of cultural and historic heritage located in the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia. To take concrete steps in this direction, the discussions focused on the possibility of establishing a joint expert group.

The twenty-eighth round of the Geneva international discussions will be held on 17 and 18 June 2014. Georgia attaches immense value to the participation of the Managing Director for Europe and Central Asia in the European External Action Service, Mr. Luis Felipe Fernández de La Peña, in the discussions during the twenty-seventh round, which constitutes an additional demonstration of the strong engagement of the European Union in conflict resolution and its steady role in peace and security in Georgia. Georgia once again welcomes the participation of the Special Representative of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Angelo Gnaedinger, and is confident that his personal input, as well as the contribution of the Swiss side to the discussions, will be of valuable importance. The Georgian participants are committed to further continuing their constructive cooperation with the co-Chairs with the aim of ensuring substantive discussions in both Working Groups.

United Nations A/68/821–S/2014/232

General Assembly
Security Council

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31 March 2014
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda items 33 (a) and 110

Prevention of armed conflict: prevention of armed conflict

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 28 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to draw your attention to the following information:

Certain websites have recently posted an audio recording of a meeting of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Chief of the Turkish Intelligence Agency, Hakan Fidan, the Turkish Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Feridun Sinirlioğlu, and the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces, Yaşar Güler. It is clear from the recording that the meeting took place recently, before the Turkish attack on the district of Kassab. Its purpose was to prepare for a Turkish attack on the Syrian Arab Republic and to create pretexts that would have conferred artificial legitimacy on that act of aggression.

During the meeting, the Turkish Foreign Minister stressed that the aggressive scheme must be consistent with international law. Turkey should appear as the victim, not the aggressor. The Chief of the Turkish Intelligence Agency said that he was prepared to manufacture any pretext to justify the attack. He said that he could send four people into Syrian territory, where they would launch eight rockets into an empty area of land in Turkey, or orchestrate an attack on the tomb of Sulayman Shah in Syrian territory. The Turkish Foreign Minister answered that Prime Minister Erdoğan had told him that an attack on the tomb of Sulayman Shah would be an opportunity that could be exploited to justify a Turkish military attack on Syria.

The recorded discussions prove what the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has stated in hundreds of formal letters, namely that Turkey has been supporting armed terrorist groups active in Syria. The Chief of the Turkish Intelligence Agency said that he had worked with the Qatari authorities to send weapons and ammunition to what he called rebels. He added that he had sent

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thousands of so-called fighters, i.e. extremist terrorists and foreign mercenaries, into Syrian territory against Government forces. He further stated that the Turkish authorities had sent over 2,000 vehicles laden with weapons and ammunition to the terrorist groups active in Syria.

Official statements issued by the Turkish Government and Prime Minister have confirmed that the recording is genuine. They denounced the leaking of a recording of a national security meeting as an immoral act. The Turkish authorities, which repeatedly and mendaciously claim to uphold human rights, have muzzled free speech, clamped down on liberties and saturated the media with warnings against the websites that posted the recording. Similar warnings have been issued to other social networks and websites that enable freedom of expression.

The Turkish Government and Armed Forces ignore the fact that the truly immoral act is their own support for terrorists. For three years, since the outset of the crisis in Syria, those terrorists have targeted Syria's people, State institutions, infrastructure and private property. Lying to the international community to justify aggression, and subsequently enlisting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, would be the lowest form of political and moral depravity, not to mention a violation of the most basic principles of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the underpinnings of relations between States.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic wishes to draw the attention of the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council to that aggressive scheme and to Turkey's malicious intentions towards the Syrian Arab Republic. The Security Council must immediately shoulder its responsibility to preserve international peace and security. It must condemn the Turkish Government for backing terrorism, and hold it fully responsible for violating the sovereignty of a Member State and supporting the armed terrorist groups that attack Syrian territory from Turkish territory. The Council must warn Turkey of the consequences of persisting in its fatuous aggressive policies in the Middle East.

The audio recording can be accessed at the following link: http://youtube.com/watch?v=GhL0N1HLhNs.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 33 (a) and 110, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2014/233

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 March 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 28 March 2014 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

Attached hereto is the work programme for the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and its Executive Directorate for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2014 (see annex).

The activities of the Committee will proceed pursuant to the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1535 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1624 (2005), 1805 (2008), 1963 (2010) and 2129 (2013).

The Committee will continue to work with Member States on the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), guided by the principles of cooperation, transparency, even-handedness and consistency in approach. The Committee will remain focused on monitoring and promoting the implementation by Member States of resolution 1373 (2001) and on taking practical measures to enhance the counter-terrorism capacity of States, including measures aimed at facilitating technical assistance. The Committee will continue to pay close attention to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1624 (2005) in its dialogue with Member States. The Committee will also continue to contribute to the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

The Committee welcomes the support it receives from Member States, the United Nations Secretariat and international, regional and subregional organizations and appreciates the assistance of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate.

The Committee would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Raimonda **Murmokaitė**
Chair
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

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Annex

Work programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee for 2014

I. Introduction

1. The overarching goal of the Counter-Terrorism Committee is to ensure the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). The Committee is further directed to include in its dialogue with Member States their efforts to implement Security Council resolution 1624 (2005).

2. Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005), 1963 (2010), 2129 (2013) and all other relevant Security Council resolutions, presidential statements and reports of the Committee constitute the guidance for the work of the Committee and of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate.

II. Work programme

3. The Committee will continue to pursue a strategic and transparent approach to its work and, with the support of the Executive Directorate and the Secretariat, will continue to streamline its working methods, as appropriate, in order to achieve the priority objectives set out below.

A. Monitoring, promoting and facilitating the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005)

4. The Committee and the Executive Directorate will collaborate actively with Member States to monitor, promote and facilitate the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005).

5. The Committee will continue to take stock of the implementation efforts of Member States in respect of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) through two assessment tools (the overview of implementation assessment and the detailed implementation survey) and continue to identify the challenges and needs of each Member State and region and facilitate the delivery of targeted technical assistance in that regard.

6. The Committee will consider information from the Executive Directorate regarding its progress in updating the technical guide to the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) in order to reflect the additional elements prescribed in the detailed implementation survey.

7. The Committee intends to consider taking stock, based on information provided by the Executive Directorate, of the implementation of the recommendations identified in the visit reports in order to assess the progress made by Member States and the effectiveness of the overall capacity-building framework and the assistance provided by relevant partners.

8. The Committee will consider the Executive Directorate's proposed workplan for updating the versions of the global implementation surveys of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), based on information gathered through the detailed implementation survey and other responses submitted by Member States.

9. The Committee will consider, based on the proposal of the Executive Directorate, a new list of country visits to be conducted during the period from January 2014 to December 2017, aimed at, inter alia, following up its previous visits, facilitating technical assistance to enhance the capacity-building of Member States, addressing evolving terrorism trends and methods and identifying good practices, experiences and lessons learned in countering terrorism.

10. The Committee, assisted by the Executive Directorate, will invite relevant officials from Member States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, to address the Committee on thematic or regional issues relating to the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005).

11. The Committee will request the Executive Directorate, in close cooperation with relevant entities of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, to hold periodic briefings for Member States on thematic or regional aspects of the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005).

12. The Committee will continue organizing special meetings and events on themes and issues of common concern and interest to Member States, with a view to maximizing the impact of the resolutions and sustaining the commitment of the international community to combat terrorism. The Committee will consider necessary follow-up activities, based on proposals by the Executive Directorate following a review by the Directorate of the outcomes of such meetings and events.

13. The Committee will, in close cooperation with the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and in accordance with its mandate, pay special attention to States concerning which information on the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) is lacking and discuss how best to enhance its dialogue with those States.

14. The Committee will report orally, through its Chair, to the Security Council on the state of the overall work of the Committee and the Executive Directorate, and, as appropriate, in conjunction with the reports by the Chairs of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

15. Pursuant to resolution 2129 (2013), the Committee, assisted by the Executive Directorate, will continue to work closely with Member States, including during country visits, on the development of comprehensive and integrated counter-terrorism strategies and on identifying available practices, elements and good standards.

16. The Committee will continue to call for the closest possible cooperation among the expert groups of the three Security Council Committees pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004), including, as appropriate, on enhanced and systematized information-sharing, coordination on visits and participation in workshops, technical assistance and relations with international, regional and subregional organizations, and will consider information from the Executive Directorate on the implementation of common strategies.

17. The Committee will consider information and proposals from the Executive Directorate on the promotion of international cooperation, the identification of emerging issues, trends and developments related to resolutions 1373 (2001) and

1624 (2005) and practical ways for Member States to implement the two resolutions.

18. The Committee will consider a comprehensive approach to preventing the spread of terrorism and incitement of terrorist acts motivated by violent extremism and intolerance, consistent with resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005). It will further consider information from the Executive Directorate on its engagement and enhancement of partnerships with international, regional and subregional organizations, development entities, civil society, academia and other entities in conducting research and information-gathering and identifying good practices, in support of the Committee's efforts to promote the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005).

19. The Committee will address the issue of the evolving nexus between terrorism and information and communication technologies, in particular the Internet, and the use of such technologies to commit terrorist acts, in accordance with resolution 2129 (2013).

20. The Committee will consider information and proposals from the Executive Directorate on its activities to enhance its dialogue and information-sharing with special envoys, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including during the planning stage of missions, as appropriate, in relation to the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005).

B. Facilitating the delivery of technical assistance to States

21. The Committee will continue to pay close attention to strengthening the role of the Executive Directorate in facilitating the delivery of technical assistance to Member States for the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005). In that context, the Committee intends to consider, based on proposals of the Executive Directorate, tools to measure the impact of donor-supported project activity linked to building capacity and cooperation.

22. The Committee will conduct an annual review and forecast of activities to facilitate the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) and cooperation in that area.

23. The Committee, assisted by the Executive Directorate, will continue its close cooperation with the relevant entities of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations aimed at enhancing the capacity of Member States to fully implement resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) and at facilitating the delivery of technical assistance.

C. Maintaining dialogue with States on the implementation of resolution 1624 (2005)

24. The Committee will consider information from the Executive Directorate in respect of its continuation to pay close attention to resolution 1624 (2005) in its dialogue with Member States; its work with Member States to develop, in accordance with their obligations under international law, strategies that include countering incitement of terrorist acts motivated by violent extremism and intolerance; and its facilitation of technical assistance for the implementation of resolution 1624 (2005).

25. The Committee will continue to encourage States that have not yet submitted a report on their implementation of resolution 1624 (2005) to do so. The Committee will also guide and support the Executive Directorate in its efforts to achieve full implementation of its plan of action, including its updates and relevant good practices for the implementation of resolution 1624 (2005).

D. Implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

26. On the basis of the participation of the Executive Directorate in the activities of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the Committee will continue to contribute to the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The Committee, based on regular briefings by the Executive Directorate on its activities within the framework of the Task Force, will continue its discussions on issues relating to the implementation of the Strategy.

E. Human rights in the context of counter-terrorism

27. The Committee will consider information from the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate regarding its progress in further developing activities in this area, to ensure that all human rights and rule of law issues relevant to the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) are addressed consistently and even-handedly, including, as appropriate, regarding country visits organized with the consent of the visited Member State and the delivery of technical assistance.

III. Other matters

28. The Committee will consider, based on the proposal of the Executive Directorate, a communication strategy aimed at promoting the visibility of the role and activities of the Committee and the Executive Directorate in counter-terrorism.

29. The Committee will consider information by the Executive Directorate on necessary efforts to co-locate the Executive Directorate and relevant entities of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.

Appendix

[Original: English]

Work programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate for 2014

I. Introduction

1. The work programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2014 has been prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of the report of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on its revitalization (S/2004/124) and takes into account the work programme of the Committee for the same period, as well as the directions provided to it by the Security Council in its resolution 2129 (2013).

2. The Executive Directorate will continue to assist the Committee to achieve its objectives in the areas defined in the Committee's work programme; to report regularly to the Committee on its work, including in its mission reports and semi-annual report; and to respond to any additional requests made during the reporting period.

II. Work programme

A. Monitoring, promoting and facilitating the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005)

3. The Executive Directorate will continue to support the Committee and collaborate actively with Member States to monitor, promote and facilitate the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005).

4. In order to further strengthen the monitoring of the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) by Member States, the Executive Directorate will continue to take stock of their implementation efforts, using the Committee's revised assessment tools (the overview of implementation assessment and the detailed implementation survey); to identify the challenges and needs of all Member States and regions; and to facilitate the delivery of targeted technical assistance in that regard.

5. The Executive Directorate will also continue its constructive dialogue with Member States, through meetings held at United Nations Headquarters, visits, workshops, and videoconferences with officials in the relevant capitals, in order to inform the Committee about the implementation by Member States of the relevant counter-terrorism resolutions, as reflected in their responses to the detailed implementation survey and the overview of implementation assessment; provide information about new counter-terrorism measures taken and updates on the facilitation of technical assistance delivery; and indicate any further needs in that regard.

6. The Executive Directorate will keep the Committee informed about its plan for updating the Committee's technical guide to the implementation of resolution 1373

(2001) to reflect the additional elements provided for in the detailed implementation survey.

7. The Executive Directorate will assist the Committee in taking stock of the implementation of the recommendations identified in the visit reports in order to assess the progress made by Member States as well as the effectiveness of the overall capacity-building framework and the assistance provided by relevant partners.

8. The Executive Directorate will keep the Committee informed about plans in respect of its work on updating the versions of the global implementation surveys of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), based on information gathered through the detailed implementation survey and other responses submitted by Member States.

9. The Executive Directorate will submit to the Committee proposals on a list of country visits to be conducted during the period from January 2014 to December 2017 aimed at, inter alia, following up on previous visits; facilitating technical assistance to enhance capacities of Member States; addressing emerging terrorism trends and methods; and identifying good practices, experiences and lessons learned in countering terrorism.

10. The Executive Directorate will assist the Committee in its arrangement to invite relevant officials from Member States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to address the Committee on thematic or regional issues relating to the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005).

11. The Executive Directorate will work in close cooperation with relevant entities of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force to hold periodic briefings for Member States on thematic or regional aspects of the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005).

12. The Executive Directorate will assist the Committee in organizing special meetings and events on themes and issues of common concern and interest to Member States with a view to maximizing the impact of the relevant resolutions and sustaining the commitment of the international community to combat terrorism. The Executive Directorate will also submit to the Committee proposals on necessary follow-up activities.

13. The Executive Directorate, in close cooperation with the Security Council Committees pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and 1540 (2004) and in accordance with its mandate, will continue to assist the Committee in paying special attention to Member States with respect to which information on the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) is lacking and to discuss how best to enhance the Committee's dialogue with those States.

14. The Executive Directorate will assist the Committee in reporting orally, through its Chair, to the Security Council on the state of the overall work of the Committee and the Executive Directorate, and, as appropriate, in conjunction with the reports by the Chairs of the Committee pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

15. Pursuant to resolution 2129 (2013), the Executive Directorate will continue to assist the Committee to work closely with Member States, including during country visits, on the development of comprehensive and integrated counter-terrorism strategies and to identify available practices, elements and good standards.

16. The Executive Directorate will provide information to the Committee on the implementation of common strategies to strengthen its cooperation with the expert groups of the Security Council Committees pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004), including, as appropriate, on enhanced and systematized information-sharing, coordination of visits and participation in workshops, facilitation of technical assistance delivery and relations with international, regional and subregional organizations, and will continue to promote the implementation of those common strategies.

17. The Executive Directorate will submit to the Committee proposals on ways to promote international cooperation, information about emerging issues, trends and developments relating to resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) and practical ways for Member States to strengthen their implementation of the two resolutions.

18. The Executive Directorate will assist the Committee in its consideration of a comprehensive approach to prevent the spread of terrorism and incitement of terrorist acts motivated by violent extremism and intolerance, consistent with resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005). The Executive Directorate will keep the Committee informed about its engagement and enhancement of partnerships with international, regional and subregional organizations, development entities, civil society, academia and other entities in conducting research and information-gathering and identifying good practices.

19. The Executive Directorate will assist the Committee in addressing the evolving nexus between terrorism and information and communication technologies, in particular the Internet, as well as the use of such technologies to commit terrorist acts, in accordance with resolution 2129 (2013).

20. The Executive Directorate will provide the Committee with information and proposals on its activities to enhance its dialogue and share information with special envoys, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including during the planning of missions, as appropriate, in relation to the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005).

B. Facilitating the delivery of technical assistance to States

21. The Executive Directorate will continue to facilitate technical assistance, specifically by promoting engagement between providers of capacity-building assistance and recipients. In that regard, the Directorate will elaborate a list of the projects included in its donor-supported activity linked to building capacity and cooperation. The Executive Directorate will also follow up with submission to the Committee of proposals on appropriate approaches and methodologies needed to assess the impact of its project activities that have been supported by donors to address specific identified technical assistance needs of the recipient Member States.

22. The Executive Directorate will assist the Committee in its conduct of an annual review and forecast of activities to facilitate the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) and cooperation in that regard.

23. The Executive Directorate will assist the Committee in working in close cooperation with the relevant Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force entities and international, regional and subregional organizations with a view to enhancing

the capacity of Member States to fully implement resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) and facilitating the delivery of technical assistance.

C. Maintaining dialogue with States on the implementation of resolution 1624 (2005)

24. The Executive Directorate will provide information to the Committee in respect of its continuation to pay close attention to resolution 1624 (2005) in its dialogue with Member States; its work with Member States to develop, in accordance with their obligations under international law, strategies that include countering incitement of terrorists acts motivated by violent extremism and intolerance; and its facilitation of technical assistance for that implementation of resolution 1624 (2005).

25. The Executive Directorate will provide information to the Committee on its efforts to achieve full implementation of its plan of action, including its updates and relevant good practices for the implementation of resolution 1624 (2005).

D. Implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

26. The Executive Directorate will provide regular briefings to the Committee on its activities within the framework of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and on issues relating to the implementation of the Strategy.

E. Human rights in the context of counter-terrorism

27. The Executive Directorate will provide information to the Committee on its further development of activities in this area, to ensure that all human rights and rule of law issues relevant to the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) are addressed consistently and even-handedly, including, as appropriate, on country visits organized with the consent of the visited Member States and on the delivery of technical assistance.

III. Other matters

28. The Executive Directorate will submit to the Committee proposals on a communication strategy aimed at promoting the visibility of the role and activities of the Committee and the Executive Directorate in counter-terrorism.

29. The Executive Directorate will provide to the Committee information on necessary efforts to co-locate the Executive Directorate and relevant entities of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.

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Agenda item 41
The situation in Central America: progress in fashioning a region of peace, freedom, democracy and development

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 28 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 26 March 2014 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Honduras, Mireya Agüero de Corrales (see annex).

That letter is addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of El Salvador, Jaime Alfredo Miranda Flamenco, and concerns a number of issues in relation to the situation in the Gulf of Fonseca.

In this connection, I respectfully request that the present letter and its annex be circulated to all the States Members of the United Nations and issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mary E. **Flores**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-28444 (E) 070414 070414

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 28 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Letter dated 26 March 2014 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Honduras addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of El Salvador

Tegucigalpa, 26 March 2014

I have the honour to refer to the note dated 24 March 2014 from the President of El Salvador, Mr. Mauricio Funes, to the President of Honduras, Mr. Juan Orlando Hernández Alvarado, and to state the following:

1. In relation to the subject of the litigation, Honduras and El Salvador, in article 2 of their special agreement of 24 May 1986, requested the International Court of Justice "... 2. To determine the legal situation of the islands and maritime spaces".

2. With respect to this request from the parties, El Salvador consistently, in all of its written submissions and also during the oral proceedings, asked the Court to determine "that El Salvador has and had sovereignty over all the islands in the Gulf of Fonseca, with the exception of the Island of Zacate Grande, which can be considered as forming part of the coast of Honduras".

3. It is surprising that such a misinformed, audacious and easily challenged statement was made at the highest level, as it must be borne in mind that the Court, in its judgment of 11 September 1992, decided that it had jurisdiction to determine the legal situation of all the islands of the Gulf, but that such jurisdiction should only be exercised in respect of those islands which had been shown to be the subject of a dispute; that the islands shown to be in dispute between the parties are El Tigre, Meanguera and Meanguerita; that the Island of El Tigre is part of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Honduras; that the Island of Meanguera is part of the sovereign territory of the Republic of El Salvador; and that the Island of Meanguerita is part of the sovereign territory of the Republic of El Salvador (para. 431, subparas. (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5), respectively, of the judgment of 11 September 1992).

4. It follows from the foregoing that even though El Salvador may have considered "all the islands of the Gulf" to be in dispute and requested the Court to recognize its sovereignty over them, the Court was of the opinion that the other islands had not been shown during the proceedings to be in dispute; that, accordingly, El Salvador could not and did not show any evidence or credible principle whereby its claims should take precedence over the rights which Honduras exercises and has always exercised over Conejo Island; and that, consequently, the Court ruled against El Salvador's claims other than those relating to the islands of Meanguera and Meanguerita.

5. The Government of Honduras has regarded the legal situation of the islands in the Gulf of Fonseca as res judicata since 11 September 1992.

6. Nonetheless, on 10 September 2002, the Government of El Salvador filed with the International Court of Justice an application for revision of the 11 September 1992 judgment with respect to the sector containing the mouth of the Goascorán River, to which Conejo Island is attached; in fact, a sandbar is exposed at low tide between the island and the Honduran coast (see the illustration in the appendix). Your Government filed that application in the hope that, if the Court found it admissible, a new ruling might be issued whereby the sector containing the mouth of the Goascorán River and Conejo Island, as a part thereof, would be recognized as belonging to El Salvador. The Court found that application inadmissible in its judgment of 18 December 2003.

7. In the light of the failed application for revision, your Government invoked another artificial claim to Conejo Island, which was rejected by the Government of Honduras, even though it is merely what legal experts refer to as a "paper claim" with no substance. This means that the same Salvadoran claim has been litigated twice, once in relation to the Goascorán sector and once in relation to Conejo Island, and the outcome in both cases was in Honduras's favour.

8. Moreover, it is a contradiction in terms to attempt to characterize as "expansionist" the exercise of sovereignty by a State, Honduras, within its own territory, as legally delimited by the International Court of Justice. The time has come to abide by the decisions of the Court, as El Salvador has exhausted all legal remedies.

9. The claim to these islands recently took an unexpected turn when the highest authorities of El Salvador stated that they lacked the military capability to claim sovereignty over Conejo Island, and then, on 30 October 2013, announced the procurement of a squadron of A-37 military attack aircraft, presumably in order to provide El Salvador with the military capability it had previously claimed to lack, in the climate of artificial tension created by your Government to oppose Honduran sovereignty. Honduras feels threatened by El Salvador's build-up of its military capability, which disrupts the balance of power against the backdrop of a dangerous media campaign.

10. Lastly, I wish to reiterate the political will of the Government of Honduras to engage in constructive bilateral and trilateral dialogue on the comprehensive development of the Gulf of Fonseca and on the delimitation, by agreement and on the basis of international law, of our respective maritime areas in the Pacific Ocean starting from the mouth of the Gulf, so as to ensure that these projections of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the continental shelf are also zones of cooperation and mutual interest for the coastal States, their respective peoples and the friendly nations of the world that wish to see this region make strides on the path to prosperity.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(*Signed*) Mireya **Agüero de Corrales**
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Appendix



The Honduran coast seen from Conejo Island at low tide; photograph by Luis Torres.

United Nations S/2014/235

Security Council

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Letter dated 28 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Kingdom of Morocco, Mr. Salaheddine Mezouar, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on the issue of the Moroccan Sahara (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as documents of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed **Loulichki**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-28974 (E) 070414 070414

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 28 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

A few weeks hence, the Security Council is going to decide on the renewal of the mandate of MINURSO and provide impetus to the quest for a political solution to the regional dispute over the Sahara.

You are aware of the importance my country attaches to a negotiated political settlement of this dispute, which has for so long impeded the building of a Maghreb that is unified, prosperous and able to respond to the security challenges that threaten it.

You are familiar as well with Morocco's efforts and initiatives to move the United Nations-sponsored political process forward.

It is in this spirit that my country has hosted your Personal Envoy, Mr. Christopher Ross, during his three visits to the region since April 2013 to launch a new approach based on discreet and confidential contacts with the parties in order to establish conditions conducive to the resumption of negotiations.

The efforts of the Personal Envoy are laudable and worthwhile, and they enjoy the full support of Morocco. However, for them to have a favourable outcome, the parties must be realistic and demonstrate a spirit of compromise. The substance of the Personal Envoy's approach must be backed by the political will of all stakeholders to contribute constructively and responsibly to its success. Through its significant and considerable contribution to the success of this new approach by the Personal Envoy, Morocco has demonstrated such political will. The other parties must demonstrate a similar degree of commitment.

Since adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2099 (2013), Morocco has met all of its commitments and taken measures that go far beyond those the Security Council has recommended.

1. Morocco has met its human rights commitments

In its resolution 2099 (2013), the Security Council welcomed the steps taken by Morocco to strengthen the National Council on Human Rights and the ongoing interaction with Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council.

During the past year, Morocco's efforts in this area have continued and been stepped up.

Implementation on the ground of the report of the Economic, Social and Environmental Council on the new development model for the southern provinces has begun, a process that also includes good governance and local democracy parameters such as those contained in the Moroccan initiative for negotiating an autonomy statute for the Sahara region.

Based on its ongoing interest in strengthening the role and effectiveness of the National Council on Human Rights, the Government of Morocco announced, on 13 March 2014, a decision to address all grievances filed by the Council, and in particular those from its two Commissions in Laayoune and Dakhla, within no more than three months. Along the same lines, focal points will be established in the

relevant ministerial departments with a view to facilitating cooperation with the Council and expediting consideration of grievances.

Interaction with the special procedures has been ongoing; since last April, Morocco has hosted the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Morocco has also declared its readiness for another visit by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture in order to consider measures taken in that sphere.

The frequency of visits to Morocco by the special procedures is without precedent in the region and in the history of the Human Rights Council. Moreover, in May, Morocco will submit its implementation report on the 140 recommendations accepted during the 2012 universal periodic review out of the 148 recommendations made.

And finally, it is my pleasure to announce that Morocco will in the near future deposit instruments of ratification for the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture.

Motivated by that same desire to continue productive cooperation with the United Nations human rights mechanisms, Morocco has extended an invitation to United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay to visit Morocco. Advanced contacts in this regard are under way with the Office of the High Commissioner.

These sustained efforts aimed at strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights nationwide are part of an approach led and fostered by His Majesty the King.

In that same vein, the Cabinet Council and the Council of Ministers have adopted a draft law on military courts that will be submitted to Parliament during its April session.

Under this draft law, which aims to strengthen the independence of the justice system and align the national legislative framework with international human rights treaties and conventions ratified by our country, civilians may no longer be tried in military courts.

2. Census of the population of the Tindouf camps

It must be noted once again that there has been no follow-up to the call by the Security Council, issued again last year, for registration of the populations of the camps of Tindouf. As the host country, Algeria must assume its responsibilities in accordance with international law. This humanitarian tragedy, unfolding in close proximity to borders that are tightly sealed, cannot be permitted to drag on indefinitely, preventing the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from discharging its statutory mandate. With regard to the fact that no census has been conducted, the credibility of the United Nations and, most especially, that of the international community, are at stake. Your report to the Security Council and the resolution to be adopted must take note of the utter lack of progress on that issue.

3. The political process

Morocco has shown yet again its desire to meet its commitments. It has advocated unceasingly for decisive participation by all parties in a substantial negotiation process. Morocco's initiative for an autonomy statute, the basis for the political process now taking place under your auspices, is indicative of Morocco's resolve to proceed in strict accordance with the parameters set by the Security Council, particularly with regard to the need to demonstrate flexibility and a spirit of compromise.

The political will of the parties and their genuine commitment must be put to the test of reality and the parties' specific actions.

Your report to the Security Council in April must, in its content, tone and recommendations, give due weight to the above measures taken by Morocco, while also creating all necessary conditions to step up the political process being carried out by your Personal Envoy. To be successful, this political process, which has Morocco's full support, must be conducted in a manner both serene and sustainable, so that the work of your Personal Envoy will be lasting in nature.

Morocco will, for its part, continue its constructive and responsible contributions to the success of this political process, a process requiring a similar degree of commitment from all of the parties to the dispute.

(*Signed*) Salaheddine **Mezouar**